Comments on the Proposed Bruce Used Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Facility

Chippewas of Nawash First Nation

Comments on Ontario Hydro's ''Comprehensive'' Study

OF THE PROPOSED
BRUCE USED NUCLEAR FUEL DRY STORAGE FACILITY

Consultants: Andrew Orkin and Gordon Edwards



SUBMITTED TO THE

CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY

NOVEMBER 1998



Table of Contents

I.   WHO WE ARE

II.   OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR TRADITIONAL LANDS, WATERS AND RESOURCES

III.   THE CONNECTION BETWEEN OUR CONSTITUTIONALLY AFFIRMED FISHING RIGHTS, THE BNPD AND THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR WASTE DRY STORAGE FACILITY

IV.   THE PRESENT EXERCISE: PUBLIC COMMENT ON A "COMPREHENSIVE STUDY"

V.   CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT PROPOSAL

VI.   KEY GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

VII.   A FUNDAMENTAL ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENT NOT MET: CUMULATIVE, OR INTEGRATED, ASSESSMENT

VIII.   ISSUES RELATED TO THE NORMAL AND ABNORMAL OPERATION OF THE BUFDSF

IX.   UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY HYDRO'S DESIGN CHANGES

X.   OTHER KEY ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE PRESENT "COMPREHENSIVE" STUDY

XI.   IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOX PROPOSAL

I.   WHO WE ARE

  1. We are the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation. Along with the Chippewas of Saugeen, we constitute the Saugeen Ojibway Nation. We are an Aboriginal people as recognized in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and have lived, governed and sustained ourselves since time immemorial in our traditional lands.

  2. Our present "reserve" is located at Cape Croker, on the west side of Georgian Bay on the Saugeen (Bruce) Peninsula.

  3. We are also known as Neyaashiingigmiing , "a point of land surrounded by water".

  4. Our people are the original inhabitants, possessors and stewards of our traditional territory, which consists of 2 million acres of lands and the waters adjacent to this land, encompassing the Saugeen (Bruce) Peninsula and the watershed of the Saugeen and Rankin River systems, extending as far south as modern-day Goderich, as far inland as modern-day Arthur and north to Collingwood.

  5. Our traditional territory also includes the waters and fisheries which surround our traditional lands.

  6. We retain important constitutional, legal, economic, social, cultural and/or spiritual links and ties with our entire traditional lands and waters, and are indeed the stewards of these lands even where they are used as well by others.


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II.   OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR TRADITIONAL LANDS, WATERS AND RESOURCES


II. A.   Our traditional lands 

  1. Along with indigenous peoples everywhere, our relationship with our traditional lands, waters and resources is profound, ongoing and an essential part of our identity and culture as well as the economy of our people that sustains us to this day. Who we are comes from the land. Our language comes from the land, our culture comes from the land, our sustenance comes from the land.

  2. Starting in the early 1800's we were subjected to great pressures to move our people off the land. In spite of the terms of Imperial Proclamations and treaties, we have suffered encroachments and forced surrenders, until now in the late 1990's we are down to a small portion of our original territory.

  3. This compression of the space we have in our traditional lands has subjected our people to great stresses. The pressures on the land itself have increased greatly. The pressure on the water has increased greatly, through overwhelming competition for resources from the other people that came to our traditional lands. The pressure on our culture, on our capacity to survive as an Aboriginal people, has also increased greatly. These stresses to which we have been subjected are very relevant to the environmental and social assessment of any proposed project that may affect us, and particularly any project whose cumulative impacts may affect our economy, subsistence, culture or way of life.

  4. It is the Ojibway understanding that all things that are of nature are living -- stones are living, trees are living and fish are living -- everything is living that has not been modified by man. Things that non-natives typically see as non-living are given a spirit and a value by aboriginal people including our people, the Chippewas of Nawash.

  5. Anything that nature provides must be respected, because then you are respecting yourself at the same time. There is a very strong obligation to respect the fact that we are all interconnected and interdependent.

  6. Our primary concern arising out of our relationship with our lands, the animals and Creation is the health and safety of our people and the web of life of which we are all a part. We find the word "environment" inadequate, for it suggests that nature is important only insofar as it surrounds or "environs" us human beings. It implies that humans are of central importance and nature is of peripheral concern. It reinforces the fallacious view that nature is something separate from humans, whereas our people have always seen themselves as an inseparable part of the web of life.

  7. We now require a public review process which will allow us to express our concerns on these matters and obtain truly comprehensive answers from Ontario Hydro.


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II. B.   Seven Miles Offshore: Our Unextinguished Aboriginal and Treaty Rights to Fish the Waters of the Saugeen (Bruce) Area  

  1. Of extreme importance, the land surrenders that we have experienced did not affect or diminish our Aboriginal rights in the surrounding waters which are part of our traditional territory, or the fishing rights traditionally exercised by our people since time immemorial. Our rights in these waters and to our fishery have also been assured to us as treaty rights. These Aboriginal and treaty rights have been recognized and affirmed in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 .

  2. We have never in any way ceded, surrendered or given up our waters or our fisheries.

  3. This context has been judicially recognized in the case of R.  v. Jones  (1993) 14 O.R. (3d) 421, which case also confirms our fishing rights in our traditional fishing grounds. According to Mr Justice Fairgrieve,

      "Consideration of the historical, anthropological and archival evidence leaves an existing Aboriginal right to fish for commercial purposes that essentially coincides with the treaty right already stated   [ arising inter alia   from the Bond Head Treaty  of 1836, confirmed by the Imperial Proclamation  of 1847 ] : the Saugeen   [ Ojibway Nation ]   have a collective ancestral right to fish for sustenance purposes in their traditional fishing grounds... on both sides of the peninsula."

  4. It is our position that our Aboriginal and treaty rights, at least to the offshore areas and fishery of the Saugeen (Bruce) Peninsula are (among other things) rights of title, ownership and possession. From a legal perspective, the court in Jones,  Nadjiwon  recognized our rights in this regard as "as a right of access to, and use of their traditional fishing grounds" and "the right to fish in those waters and to enjoy the benefit of the resource to be found there." Moreover, the recent Supreme Court ruling in the Delgamuukw  case reaffirms the fundamental importance of, and Crown obligations of respect for, Aboriginal title and treaty rights, including the resource components of these rights and title.

  5. It is of critical importance in the present context to repeat that our Aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized and affirmed in s. 35, being Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982 . These rights may not be infringed, abridged, curtailed or diminished.

  6. Our Aboriginal rights to our Lake Huron fishery are not only legal rights. These rights have important commercial, economic, subsistence, cultural, spiritual, symbolic and educational components. This pursuit is a core component of who we are , and a harm or potential harm to the fish or to our fishery is a direct harm to us. 


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III.   THE CONNECTION BETWEEN OUR CONSTITUTIONALLY AFFIRMED FISHING RIGHTS, THE BNPD AND THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR WASTE DRY STORAGE FACILITY


    [ BNPD = Bruce Nuclear Power Development ]

  1. Although the Chippewas of Nawash reserve at Cape Croker is situated on Georgian Bay some 80 kilometers northwest of BNPD, our commercial fishery pursuant to our Aboriginal and treaty rights are conducted, to a large extent, in the waters of Lake Huron.

  2. From a commercial fishery perspective, the BNPD is located on the shore of Lake Huron Management Area 4-4. Radioactively contaminated water from Bruce Nuclear Generating Stations A and B is discharged directly into the waters of Management area 4-4. In addition, atmospheric emissions may end up in these same waters.

  3. The harvest of fish from Management Area 4-4 represents the single largest component of the Nawash commercial fishery. A great deal of our lake whitefish (Coregonus clupeaformis )   comes from the Management Area 4-4. Therefore, the health of the water and the fish populations in the vicinity of the BNPD is fundamentally important to us.


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IV.   THE PRESENT EXERCISE: PUBLIC COMMENT ON A "COMPREHENSIVE STUDY"


  1. The present exercise consists of public comment in the course of environmental assessment, pursuant to the provisions of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act  (''the CEA Act'') ,  concerning the "Comprehensive Study" (CS) relating to the proposed Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility or UFDSF ("the proposed Facility"). The Comprehensive Study consists mainly of

      the 1997 Environmental Assessment [''EA (1997)''] and

      the 1998 Addendum to the Environmental Assessment [''Addendum to the EA (1998)''] , as well as

      the Safety Report,

      a Summary Report and

      a number of other ancillary documents.

    Our comments will focus primarily on EA (1997) and Addendum to the EA (1998) .

  2. These comments are submitted to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (the "Agency") as part of the environmental assessment of the proposed Facility. Our comments are provided under reserve of, and without prejudice to:

    • the status and rights of the First Nation,

    • any positions we may take with respect to the jurisdiction of the Agency, and

    • any positions we may take with respect to the scope of the present assessment or the "splitting" of this assessment in such a way as to deal with the proposed high-level nuclear waste storage facility isolated from consideration of other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

  3. This comment from the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation is submitted pursuant to the requirements of the CEA Act. It is therefore important to identify the key requirements of the CEA Act in this regard, and evaluate the Comprehensive Study according to these requirements.


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IV. A.   Environmental effects 

  1. As discussed immediately below, a CEA Act comprehensive study is concerned with "environmental effects. "Environmental effects" are defined in s. 2(1) of the CEA Act as:

        "(a) any change that the project may  cause in the environment, including any effect of any such change on health and socio economic conditions, on physical and cultural heritage, on the current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes by aboriginal persons , or on any structure, site or thing that is of historical, archaeological, paleontological or architectural significance . . . .

      whether such change occurs within or outside Canada . . . .  "

      (Emphases added)

    1. The CEA Act defines "the environment" in s. 2(1) as

        ". . . the components of the Earth, and includes:

          (a) land, water  and air, including all layers of the atmosphere,

          (b) all organic and inorganic  matter and living organisms, and

          (c) the interacting natural systems  that include components referred to in paragraphs (a)  and (b); ... "

          (Emphases added)

    2. It should thus be noted that in the terms of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, environmental impacts:

        i) need not be certain, or even probable, but only possible;

        ii) include any effect of any such change on:

        • health conditions 

        • socio-economic conditions 

        • physical and cultural heritage , and

        • the current use of their traditional lands and resources for traditional purposes by aboriginal persons ;

        iii) clearly envisage consideration of such impacts beyond narrow geographic, political or cultural boundaries;

        iv) include and comprehend lands and waters , and all organic and inorganic matter and living organisms, thus including fish and ourselves (the Chippewas of Nawash people).


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    IV. B.   Cumulative impacts and other aspects of comprehensive study 


    1. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act provides in s. 16(1) that:

        "16. (1) Every... comprehensive study of a project... shall  include a consideration of the following factors:

          (a)  the environmental effects  of the project, including the environmental effects of malfunctions or accidents that may occur in connection with the project and any cumulative environmental effects  that are likely to result from the project in combination with other projects that have been or will be carried out ;..." (Emphases added)

          (b)  the significance of the effects referred to in paragraph (a) ,

          (c)  comments from the public that are received in accordance with this Act and the regulations;

          (d)  measures that are technically and economically feasible and that would mitigate any significant adverse environmental effects of the project; and

          (e)  any other matter..." (Emphases added.)

    2. The CEA Act further provides in s. 16(2) that:

        "In addition to the factors set out in subsection (1), every comprehensive study of a project... shall include a consideration of the following factors :

          (a) the purpose of the project;

          (b) alternative means of carrying out the project  that are technically and economically feasible and the environmental effects of any such alternative means..." (Emphases added.)

    3. It can be seen that the content  of a comprehensive study is thus statutorily prescribed in mandatory terms.

    4. With respect to the scope  of the factors identified in s. 16 (1)(a), (b) and (d) of the CEA Act, and certain other specified factors, the Act does provide that this is determined by the ''responsible authority'' (in this case the Atomic Energy Control Board [AECB]).

    5. It can be presumed, however, notwithstanding the power of the responsible authority to determine the scope  of some of the key factors to be considered including cumulative impacts, that this provision (s. 16 (1)) in the CEA Act clearly does not  envisage that:

      • the treatment of these required elements in a comprehensive study may be patently false, inaccurate, misleading, selective, superficial or otherwise inadequate; or

      • public concern be somehow constrained by such a determination of scope.


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    V.   CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT PROPOSAL


    V. A.   Description of the environment in the Comprehensive Study  


    1. It is critically important to our people that the environment in which we live be adequately described to include us and our understanding of our environment. Only thus will the description offer some meaningful potential that our concerns will be understood.

    2. The description of the environment provided in the Comprehensive Study is however, from the perspective of the Chippewas of Nawash, wholly inadequate and inaccurate in significant respects.

    3. The Comprehensive Study does not adequately describe the Chippewas of Nawash relationship with our traditional lands and waters. It is impossible to adequately discuss or assess the impacts of an undertaking on our people where the proponent [Ontario Hydro] and the Responsible Authority [the Atomic Energy Control Board] provide a Comprehensive Study that so "misses the mark" with respect to such fundamental factors.

    4. With respect to fishing activities, there is a brief reference to the use of Lake Huron for "sport and commercial fishing" in EA (1997) s. 3.4.1, but this two-line statement does not even mention the Chippewas of Nawash.

    5. With respect to Aboriginal peoples, a one-page section in the Comprehensive Study (EA (1997), s. 3.7.2) under the heading "Social and Economic Conditions" describes the Chippewas of Nawash and of Saugeen in a literal and shallow manner. Our traditional lands and waters are mentioned, but our profound relationship with these elements of the environment fail to gain the attention of the proponent.

    6. There is a considerable body of literature available -- including legal, political, sociological and anthropological studies concerning our people, written by our own people and by non-Aboriginal authors -- that considers the environment from a perspective of Aboriginal peoples and meaningfully includes us and our relationships with our lands in their description. In addition, our people themselves are always available to those who ask to explain these things. It is very distressing to us that in spite of this information being readily accessible, such inadequate descriptions of the environment have been drafted by the proponent [Ontario Hydro]and declared acceptable by the Responsible Authority [AECB].

    7. Our economy, culture, values, rights and our relationship with our lands, waters and fishery are worthy of full description and consideration in this context. The failure of the Comprehensive Study to adequately address and assess (a) the social and economic effects and (b) the "cumulative" effects of this proposed Facility are attributable to this failure in the Comprehensive Study to adequately describe the environment in a manner that includes our concerns.

    8. The proponent and Responsible Authority cannot state that they are unaware that this is necessary; indeed in EA (1997) s. 4.7 (at p. 113), it is stated that "Socio-economic impacts are effects on people, their livelihoods, lifestyles, communities and culture, from development, including those effects they perceive as significant. "

    9. We therefore ask: when will these our most significant and fundamental concerns "appear on the radar" of those whose works are proposed for our traditional lands? Is it unreasonable to insist that this be done, not perfectly because no-one can perfectly portray the work of the Creator, but just that our own understanding of our environment -- including our social, economic, cultural, spiritual and physical relationships with our traditional lands and waters -- be adequately described?

    10. The failure in the Comprehensive Study to do so is itself a breach of our Aboriginal and treaty rights, and of the fiduciary relationship of the Crown, its officials and its agents towards us.


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    V. B.   No precedent for the proposed facility 


    1. It is stated in the Comprehensive Study (at EA (1997), s 2.2.3) that dry storage technology is currently used elsewhere in Canada.

    2. From the perspective of the Chippewas of Nawash, there is no applicable precedent anywhere for the proposed facility, because there is no other environment in which the present, unique environmental, social and economic circumstances exist as they do in the Saugeen (Bruce) context. 

    3. These unique circumstances include:

      • the presence of a unique Aboriginal people -- the Chippewas of Nawash -- which has fundamental Aboriginal and treaty rights that are exercised in the immediate vicinity of a facility such as the proposed facility, and which exercise is and may be further infringed or destroyed by the proposed facility and the undertaking of which it is part;

      • the unique nature of the fundamental Aboriginal rights that are involved, namely rights to a commercial fishery in the immediate vicinity and in the immediate terrestrial, aquatic and atmospheric discharge zone of the proposed facility and the nuclear plants of which it is an integral part;

      • an entirely new range of circumstances under which this project is now being proposed, which include:

        • the shutdown of Bruce A, occasioned by recent revelations that the nuclear industry is not, as was stated and assumed, consistently operated in a safe and competent manner;

        • the radical reorganization of the North American energy sector including Ontario Hydro;

        • the failure of the nuclear industry's concept for deep geologic burial of high level nuclear waste to obtain approval as being sufficiently safe or socially acceptable to the Canadian public;

        • increasing understanding and legal acceptance of the rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples; and

        • increasing uncertainty in Canada and elsewhere concerning the viability of the nuclear power industry.

    4. With respect to the unique circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is not important whether the proponent or the Responsible Authority agree with, or consider these circumstances relevant. As acknowledged in EA 1997, s. 4.7 of the Comprehensive Study , socio-economic effects include those effects perceived as significant , and it stands to reason that these must be assessed according to a description of the environment that is adequate to do these perceptions justice.


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    VI.   KEY GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS


    1. We are keenly aware of the fact that Ontario Hydro, in its proposed dry UFDSF, is planning to store highly dangerous radioactive poisons which must be sequestered from the environment for millions of years. Although we accept that Ontario Hydro wishes and intends to do this in a safe and secure way, we do not share Hydro's confidence as presented in the Comprehensive Study and in general of its own technological prowess and managerial ability, to ensure that virtually all of these radioactive materials will be kept out of our air, food and water under all normal and abnormal conditions, for the lifetime of the facility.

    2. The public record establishes that our surroundings and traditional lands and waters are already significantly contaminated with radioactive substances -- particularly radioactive hydrogen and carbon -- from normal and abnormal operations of the Bruce reactors and waste management facilities.

    3. Given Ontario Hydro's track record on tritium and carbon-14 emissions at Bruce and recent revelations regarding deficient operations and management practices in the corporation, we submit that we are now entitled to have an opportunity to question Hydro's abilities in regard to the dry storage proposal through a federal assessment conducted by an independent panel, with public hearings.

    4. We are concerned that the Report does not provide any comparative data by which to assess the radioactivity levels in Lake Huron fish, especially considering the availability of such data. By virtue of the legal requirement for cumulative impact assessment, this data is relevant and material in the present context. In Ontario Hydro's "Annual Summary and Assessment of Environmental Radiological Data for 1995", the tritium concentrations used in calculation of 1995 Critical Group Dose are shown on Table 5.1.2.2A. The measurements reported for locally caught fish in the vicinity of nuclear reactor sites are as follows:

        Darlington Nuclear Generating Station: 8 Bq/L

        Pickering Nuclear Generating Station: 34 Bq/L

        Bruce Nuclear Power Development: 97 Bq/L

    5. We ask:

        Why are the tritium concentrations in Lake Huron fish more than eleven times higher than the concentrations measured at Darlington, and nearly double the concentrations measured at Pickering? 

    6. Surely this elevated tritium level represents a cumulative environmental effect worth considering, both from the perspective of the current use of resources by aboriginal people and from the perspective of overall health and socio-economic conditions. Yet these data are nowhere mentioned in the Comprehensive Study, nor is the issue of drastically reducing overall tritium emissions at Bruce addressed. The proponent is content to claim simply that tritium emissions from the proposed dry UFDSF will be a relatively small contribution in view of the overall emissions.

    7. The Section of EA 1977 which discusses radioactivity in drinking water notes that "tritium concentrations are higher at Port Elgin than at Kincardine due to the higher frequency of lake currents flowing from BNPD towards Port Elgin." (EA 1977, s. 3.6.3.4, p. 69). The existence of a predominantly northward lake current must have implications for our fishery, directing radioactivity toward the major spawning grounds for lake whitefish. Regrettably this potential effect has not been considered by the Report.

    8. Our concerns are reinforced by our reading of a report concerning tritium levels in drinking water in Scarborough (on Lake Ontario) and Port Elgin (on Lake Huron) (see excerpt attached to this document as "Appendix 1"). The report attempts to analyze the pattern of tritium contamination in drinking water at the two locations (using time series) without much success. In the Concluding section of the report, the author writes:

        "When comparing the Scarborough and the Port Elgin series, we notice two features. The vertical scales differ drastically: the Scarborough measurements range from 3.70 to 159.84 Bq/l, whereas those at Port Elgin range from 7.4 to 732.6 Bq/l.

        The two series also differ in structure: excluding the one outlier in August 1992, there are no large peaks in the Scarborough series after May 1988. In fact, we observe a slight downward trend in the mean towards the end of the series in 1993. The Port Elgin series, on the other hand, continues to show occasional large peaks throughout the entire observation period.

        These differences can be attributed to two factors: the currents in Lake Ontario vary greatly in terms of direction, so the tritium is well dispersed by the time any of it reaches any given WSP. On the other hand, Lake Huron currents are predominantly towards the North, so Port Elgin received most of the leaked tritium.

        Management philosophies at the two stations are also different: at Pickering NGS, several units were shut down, starting in 1988, for extended periods of time in order to inspect the primary heat exchangers and to plug tubes with significant wall loss before they started to leak. This may well be the reason for not seeing any major peaks in the Scarborough series after 1988. At Bruce A and B, however, the objective has been to keep the units running for as long as possible, tolerating minor leaks until they reached certain levels. Scheduled inspections and repairs were done, but not to the same extent as at Pickering. Thus we continue to see occasional peaks reflecting spills at the two stations over the entire Port Elgin series."

        Ontario Hydro internal report
        (1994; author not identified)

    9. We ask:

        Why are tritium levels in drinking water at Port Elgin from 2 to 6 times as high as the tritium levels in drinking water at Scarborough, close to the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station?

        Why is this not discussed in the Comprehensive Study, as part of the ongoing and cumulative impacts of the proposed Facility and the undertaking of which (in the words of Ontario Hydro) it is an integral part? 


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    VI. C.   Selection of dry storage option 

    1. We are not confident that Ontario Hydro has a commitment to put protection of people and other living things above the operational and economic priorities of the corporation. This is how Ontario Hydro describes its own internal reasons for choosing the dry storage option:

        "Used fuel generated by the operation of Bruce NGS-A and Bruce NGS B is currently stored under water in primary and secondary Irradiated Fuel Bays (IFBs) of each station. These fuel bays are projected to be full in 1999 and 2003, respectively. Additional storage capacity will, therefore, be required to allow operation of the stations beyond the year 2000....

        To provide the additional storage space needed for used fuel at BNPD site, various dry and wet options were considered. Based on a comparison of these options with respect to their technical feasibility, implementation schedule, constructability, operability, licensability and cost , the dry storage option was chosen as the overall best option.... " (Emphasis added.)

        Section 1.1.1, BUFDSF Safety Report, 1997

    2. Significantly, Hydro makes no mention of cumulative impacts, health, safety, or environmental protection (for example)  in determining which option to pursue. This does not inspire confidence in Ontario Hydro's approach. It suggests a frame of mind in which cumulative impacts, health, safety, and environmental protection are at best "after-thoughts" rather than uppermost. The Chippewas of Nawash must be given an opportunity to question Ontario Hydro representatives on their priorities.

    3. In the fall of 1997, an internal review of Ontario Hydro's nuclear operations was concluded by American experts brought in by senior Hydro management. One of the major findings of that review was that the "safety culture" in Hydro's nuclear division was so far below standard that it was only "marginally acceptable" -- as low as it could get without being unacceptable. Safety-related procedures were in many cases handled in a superficial, slap-dash and unprofessional manner, without an appreciation by managers or workers of the potential consequences of following substandard practices. The situation was so serious, with such a large backlog of safety-related maintenance problems, that seven of Ontario Hydro's reactors were shut down to allow time for improvements to be made in the physical plant as well as in the attitudes and practices of management and workers. These events have shaken our confidence in Ontario Hydro's assurances.

    4. The Chippewas of Nawash are not convinced that Ontario Hydro displays the necessary humility and respect for the inherent biological dangers associated with the radioactive poisons in irradiated nuclear fuel. Other responsible bodies, independent of the nuclear industry, have described irradiated nuclear fuel as the most potentially dangerous and toxic material known to humankind.

    5. We have read that in its Interim Report on Nuclear Energy, the Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning reported that:

        "The extreme lethality of a freshly removed spent fuel bundle is such that a person standing within a metre of it would die within an hour. During the next forty years (and probably for thousands of years), the management of hundreds of thousands of such bundles (in Ontario alone), which at all times must be isolated from the earth's ecosystem, will clearly present a problem of massive proportions."

        A Race Against Time , p. 87
        Ontario Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning

    6. We have also read that the Ontario Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs wrote:

        "The radioactive products in spent nuclear fuel pose a threat to human health for a period of time that is longer than the history of civilization. The initial threat is the most intense. It comes from the heat and radioactive emissions of the active fission products. After about 600 years these products will have decayed to relatively low levels. For several hundred thousand years, radioactive emissions from long-lived elements called actinides continue.

        After about 17,000 years unreprocessed spent fuel has about the same level of toxicity as the Elliot Lake uranium ore body from which it was taken. Given the very long life of these toxic materials, no man-made containment system can ever be predicted to give sufficient protection."

        The Management of Nuclear Fuel Waste , June 1980.
        Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs

    7. And, in the same report, the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs added the following:

        "The consensus of the Committee is that communities are not likely to easily accept the siting of what will be perceived as a garbage dump for frightening nuclear poisons. The waste must be disposed of. It must be disposed of safely and permanently. In the Committee's view, it is most likely that government will ultimately have to choose where the unpopular site will be located...."

        The Management of Nuclear Fuel Waste , June 1980.

    8. Given the nature of these materials and the controversy surrounding their ultimate disposition, we feel that a federal environmental assessment of Hydro's proposed dry storage Facility, conducted in public by an independent panel, is absolutely required.


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    VII.   A FUNDAMENTAL ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENT NOT MET: CUMULATIVE, OR INTEGRATED, ASSESSMENT


    1. The official AECB "Summary Report" states, in reference to the Cumulative Effects Assessment supposedly undertaken in the Comprehensive Study , that "the project will be a relatively minor contributor to adverse and positive cumulative environmental effects" at BNPD.

    2. The AECB summary declares that this conclusion was "based on a broad based and qualitative assessment of the potential effects of the proposed Facility in combination with those of existing/ongoing, planned and foreseeable actions/physical works at the BNPD site over the short, medium and long terms."

    3. In light of the provisions of the CEA Act referred to above regarding cumulative assessment of environmental effects that are likely to result from the project in combination with other projects that have been or will be carried out,   we feel that it is imperative that the environmental effects of the other aspects of the BNPD of which it is part be adequately assessed, in a fully integrated manner .

    4. Significantly, Ontario Hydro's itself states (in EA (1997), at s. 1.2) that the proposed Facility is "a necessary and integral part  of the program of operating and maintaining the Bruce A and Bruce B stations " and (in the AECB "Summary Report") that "the continued operation of radioactive waste management facilities at the BNPD, including the proposed Used Dry Fuel Storage Facility, is integral to the ongoing nuclear power generation activities of Ontario Hydro... ". (Emphases added.)

    5. Notwithstanding this official picture of integration of storage and generation, the present comprehensive study assessment is biased to consideration of the environmental impacts of the proposed Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility as a discrete undertaking. In the Comprehensive Study no meaningful attempt is made to integrate the environmental assessment of the proposed dry UFDSF with various options such as:

      • the (unanticipated) lay-up of Bruce A,

      • the restart (or not) of Bruce A,

      • the early retirement (or not) of Bruce B,

      • the expansion of Radioactive Wastes Operations Site 2,

      • the siting (or not) of a low-level radioactive waste repository at Bruce,

      • the siting (or not) of a high-level radioactive waste repository somewhere in Canada,

      • the use of MOX fuel (or not) at Bruce,

      • the launch of a fusion research facility (or not) at Bruce...

    6. In the half-page (out of three-and-a-half pages) devoted to cumulative assessment in the AECB "Summary Report", it is stated -- falsely and misleadingly in our view when the Summary is compared with the Comprehensive Study itself  -- that the Cumulative Effects Assessment conclusions were "based on a broad-based and qualitative assessment of the potential effects of the proposed Facility in combination with those of existing/ongoing, planned and foreseeable actions/physical works at the BNPD site over the short, medium and long terms." We will have more to say on this subject below.

    7. There is only very limited discussion in the Comprehensive Study of cumulative effects from an Aboriginal perspective: EA (1997) at s. 4.10, pp 126 - 29 (three pages out of one hundred and fifty); and Addendum to the EA (1998) at Tab 3, Table 2 (four lines) as well as Tables 13 and Appendix A Table ("Potential Aboriginal Issues and Significance"; unnumbered).

    8. From our Chippewa/Aboriginal perspective, the cumulative assessments provided in both EA (1997) and in Addendum to the EA (1998) are inadequate and unsatisfactory.

    9. In EA (1997), there is no apparent understanding or even meaningful mention of cumulative effects from an Aboriginal perspective. Nevertheless it is stated conclusively and without any substantiation  (at p.129) that:

      • "there are no significant adverse socio-economic effects anticipated  with this proposal" (emphasis added), and

      • "there are established mechanisms for ongoing public involvement and problem resolution", and

      • "the project is therefore considered to have no significant incremental or cumulative adverse environmental effects ." (emphasis added)

      It is against the backdrop of these superficial and tendentious statements and sweeping conclusions that the subsequent cumulative assessment in Addendum to the EA (1998) must be viewed.

    10. The cumulative assessment undertaken in the Addendum to the EA (1998) is considerably more detailed, but displays, in our view, little more comprehension. For example, the Addendum to the EA (1998) cumulative assessment simply repeats verbatim highly problematic statements from EA (1997) -- for example at p. 1:

        "The project is not intended to alter the basic purpose, use or capacity of the existing on-site generation facilities. It is intended to allow these facilities to continue operating as planned and approved."

    11. As indicated above, this statement is at best misleading and at worst false. BUFDSF is acknowledged to be an integral part of the Bruce nuclear power development facility , but it will greatly increase the capacity and possibly extend the duration of high-level waste stored at the site, perhaps indefinitely, thus transforming the nature of the entire BNPD facility. This transformation was never ''planned and approved''. BNPD was not originally conceived as a potentially permanent radioactive waste-storage facility with outdoor high-level radioactive waste storage components. The manner of presentation in the Comprehensive Study , which is imbued with a tone of self-justification, coupled with the uncritical acceptance of ill-supported conclusions, such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, bring the cumulative assessment into doubt.

    12. The treatment of surface water / aquatic biology effects is, in our view totally inadequate, reflecting the cursory treatment given to our fishery concerns in EA (1997). In this regard, it is simply stated that (at Table 9, Tab 3):

        "Bruce B operations will continue to be a source of potential  contaminants to the soils, groundwater and surface water. The adverse effects of contaminants in surface waters on aquatic life is expected  to be very minor." (Emphasis added.)

    13. The above statement disturbs us greatly.

        First, we believe it is plainly false, in that contamination of water is not merely a "potential" effect, but an existing one, for example with tritium contamination at Bruce established to be at levels disturbingly higher than other Ontario nuclear contexts.

        Second, we cannot accept that there is adequate knowledge -- especially in light of past experience with respect to "safe" thresholds of nuclear or toxic contamination -- that it can be stated with any confidence that the adverse effects of radioactive contaminants in surface waters will be "very minor" or "minor... as the site will continue to operate within regulatory limits".

        Third, what exactly is the established relationship between "minor impacts" and current "regulatory limits"?

    14. Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) staff have expressed concerns that the railway ditch close to the proposed UFDSF may have become a viable fish habitat in need of protection. However, we have found no quantitative data in Hydro's documentation concerning current habitat suitability in the ditch, even though it "contains some small open areas of water in which schools of minnow sized fish of unspecified species were observed." [Addendum to the EA (1998), s. 7, p. 9] This information gap is not an isolated case, but is symptomatic of a general lack of reliable data regarding potentially affected aquatic environments. We believe that the lack of adequate baseline data adds significantly to the uncertainty as to the nature and extent of any adverse effects that might occur. Tritium is well-known as a teratogen and mutagen as well as carcinogen (UNSCEAR 1977 - Appendices G and H). Also, tritium has ready access to all living cells including reproductive and embryonic cells. Thus the inherent uncertainty in biological effect following radiation exposure is greatly increased when affected fish populations are spawning, hatching, or maturing as they are exposed to tritium. An independent assessment by a panel is needed.

    15. The drainage ditch from the proposed UFDSF site runs directly into the railway ditch, which "in turn flows into a wetland and then Stream C, eventually flowing into Baie du Doré, Lake Huron. Fish sampling studies have been done in Stream C, as far upstream as the railway tracks. Brook trout were found at this location. Since there is no barrier to fish movement in the watercourse system from Lake Huron to well past the proposed dry storage facility site, it is necessary to establish the extent to which fish use the area upstream of Fish Sampling Station G (brook trout location)." (Addendum to the EA (1998), s. 7, p. 9) Despite these facts, which were ascertained by DFO staff, and although in Appendix F it is noted that salmon and trout do use sections of Stream C as reproductive habitat Hydro's documentation in support of the proposed UFDSF does not discuss the extent to which Stream C may be used as a spawning habitat or as a juvenile nursery area for salmonids. In fact, as far as we can determine, Hydro has collected no data on the following economically or recreationally important fish species found in the vicinity of the proposed development:

        Brown trout (Salmo trutta  )

        Brook trout (Salvelinus fontinalis  )

        Rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss  )

        Smallmouth bass (Micropterus  dolomieu )

        Largemouth bass (Micropterus salmoides )

        Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha )

    16. In the absence of data on habitat quality or suitability baselines, Hydro has no basis for claiming "minimal environmental effects" from the proposed facility. In fact, Hydro is not in any position to compare actual post-project conditions to pre-project conditions in order to establish whether or not significant effects have occurred. Although Hydro has promised to carry out monitoring and remediation if necessary, no specifics as to the planned monitoring activities have been given.

    17. In its Addendum to the EA (1998), Hydro argues that the lack of complete aquatic environmental data is balanced -- and to some extent justified -- by the extremely low chance that any contamination might occur. Citing the 1977 BUFDSF Safety Report (Addendum to the EA (1998), s. 7, p. 9) Hydro states that the release of contaminants from the UFDSF is "very unlikely" -- especially in liquid form. However, these assurances -- drawn from the BUFDSF Safety Report -- are based on the assumption that there is no contamination on the surface of the containers, thanks to the dry loading procedure that will be used. Specifically, the Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Containers are designed to be loaded using a dry transfer method so that ''there will be no spread of contamination to areas off-site when the containers are transported to the storage area.'' (EA (1997), s. 4.6.1.1.1, p. 98)

    18. But even while the Addendum to the EA (1998) cites the 1977 Safety Report -- with its fixation on dry spent fuel transfer and zero surface contamination -- the same Addendum suggests very strongly that a wet-loading method may end up being used at Bruce instead. (Addendum to the EA (1998), s. 2 in toto). The wet-loading method would be similar to the one currently employed at the Pickering NGS: the container is lowered into the pool, filled with irradiated fuel, then lifted out, drained, and dried. One of the drawbacks of this method is that the surface of the container can become contaminated with radioactive corrosion products or fission products that are found in the pool water. Any radioactive contamination on the surface of the containers could later be washed off in a storm and contaminate the nearby surface water systems. Evidently this will increase the probability of radioactive contamination of surface waters, and add to the uncertainty regarding possible environmental effects.

    19. The declared limitations to the Addendum to the EA (1998) cumulative effects section (at Tab 3, p. 5) provide important insights as to the validity of its conclusions that affect our people:

        "No original field work, new  [ presumably, post EA (1997) ]   research or consultation with potentially affected people and groups was possible... identification of potential effects were based largely on the information provided in the EA report already submitted by Ontario Hydro..."

          Thus, we must ask, does the Addendum to the EA (1998) cumulative assessment simply recycle the blanket, unsubstantiated positive conclusions of EA (1997)?

        "only limited information available regarding ... future activities... ... as a result this overview CEA   [ Cumulative Effects Assessment ]   is largely qualitative in nature..."

          Thus, we must ask, what of our Aboriginal cumulative effect concerns, which are significantly concerned with these future activities, to which the project is linked?

        "[ only ]   addresses effects under normal operational conditions and does not include effects from significant abnormal events..."

          Thus, we must ask, what confidence would one have had in a cumulative assessment of a Three Mile Island or Chernobyl plant had also been restricted to normal operational conditions? Are not concerns about the cumulative impacts of significant abnormal events of the essence in such an assessment? Is the proponent declaring us wrong in believing this to be the case, by virtue of the terms of reference for this cumulative assessment?

        "It was more difficult to assess the cumulative effects on First Nations communities because there is only limited information available and the difficulty of assessing the meaning or significance of comments made by some First Nations people."

          It is hard to know how to respond to a statement such as this. We must ask: ''limited information ?''   ''difficulty of assessing meaning or significance?''

          We cannot accept that a large, sophisticated and wealthy corporation such as Ontario Hydro, and its consultants, could not obtain the information required in this context, particularly through first-hand consultation with our people in conjunction with any necessary expert assistance.

          Was this cumulative effects assessment ''difficulty'' a budgetary restraint or a time problem? Or was it actually based on indifference? We do not believe that our concerns are hard to understand, or to recognize as extremely significant (if not to everyone, then at the very least to most of our people).

    20. With respect to the consideration of "cumulative effects on Aboriginal issues" (in Addendum to the EA (1998), Tab 3, Table 13), we can only agree with some of the (unfortunately very brief and mechanically repeatedly cut-and-pasted) tabular "assessments" of our concerns, namely those regarding stewardship of lands, waters and resources, and the incompatibility of these undertakings with our culture, way of life and economy.

    21. Sadly, these few blanket observations in Table 13 regarding our "issues" does not translate into what we would consider a full cumulative effects assessment . Rather, it appears to result in three central "products" of relevance to us:

      • at p. 47 - 48, a statement that Ontario Hydro intends to "work with First Nations to provide a more complete assessment of the social and economic effects of all current and planned activities at the BNPD site. This ongoing work may address  [various issues are listed]..." (emphasis added);

      • a statement that in spite of various acknowledgments of increased radioactive contaminant discharges, "public concern" about these discharges into the aquatic environment is only
        "Moderate - Potential for contamination of Lake Huron remains a concern".
        We strongly dispute the accuracy of this conclusion, and believe that it brings the competence and adequacy of the Comprehensive Study into doubt. (It should be noted in this context that it is acknowledged in Addendum to the EA (1998) that in most other respects, Aboriginal public concern regarding various effect of the proposed Facility is "high"); and

      • a single page table titled "Potential Aboriginal Issues and Significance" at the end of the cumulative effects section in Tab 3, Addendum to the EA (1998).

    22. With respect to the first bulleted item in the preceding paragraph, we do not find in the CEA Act that it is envisaged that cumulative assessment of First Nations' socio economic concerns can legally be postponed at the proponent's pleasure until after the CEA Act assessment has been commenced or completed. This statement is outrageous and appears to us for that reason to constitute a clear strategy to evade the requirements of the governing legislation .

    23. With respect to the second bulleted item, we must ask: Why are our profound concerns about aquatic discharges not explicitly acknowledged to be high, in the Addendum to the EA (1998) Appendix Table, section on aquatic effects?

    24. With respect to the third bulleted item, we are gratified to note that the intensity of our (Aboriginal) "public concerns" are reflected as being generally high, and that our concerns are at least briefly acknowledged. Unfortunately, they are not reflected in the body of the report accordingly, and most importantly, do not make it into the general conclusions (particularly, as noted, in the Summary of the Comprehensive Study).


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    VII. A.   Need for a Comprehensive Baseline Study 

    1. As mentioned above, according to section 16(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, Hydro has an explicit requirement to assess cumulative effects, which are changes to the environment that are caused by an action in combination with other past, present and future human actions. In assessing cumulative effects, temporal and spatial boundaries must be enlarged so that environmental changes brought about by such actions can be adequately tracked in time and space.

    2. We believe that this requirement has not been met by Ontario Hydro. Indeed, we maintain that there are insufficient baseline data concerning radioactivity (especially tritium and carbon-14 levels) in the region around BNPD at present to be able to detect incremental changes and ascribe them to a specific action. This makes a consideration of some of the most significant cumulative effects impossible, and greatly increases the uncertainty related to the detection of adverse effects.

    3. The Chippewas of Nawash believe that no major new facilities should be added to the BNPD site until a comprehensive baseline study has been conducted and a reliable database established. We believe that this should entail a study of existing radionuclide concentrations in living and non-living components of the neighbouring region, including the fish of Lake Huron Management Area 4.4 -- where many lake whitefish are harvested by the Nawash commercial fishery, and where the BNPD itself is located (on the shore adjacent to the Management Area).

    4. In particular, the Chippewas of Nawash believe it is essential for such a comprehensive baseline study to be completed before consideration is given to the construction of a Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility (UFDSF) as currently proposed.


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    VII. B.   Cumulative effects assessments concerning specific radionuclides: tritium, carbon-14, etc. 

    1. To be truly useful in tracking the cumulative radiological impact of Ontario Hydro facilities on the region, a baseline study should focus on the degree to which specific radionuclides which are routinely or occasionally released into the natural environment by BNPD, such as tritium, carbon-14, or cesium-137, are interacting with and affecting the living and non-living components of the region. We believe that Ontario Hydro should undertake such a comprehensive baseline study with the goal of restoring the natural environment as much as possible to its natural state. This would involve eliminating all unnecessary radioactive emissions and adopting as an ultimate goal the achievement of zero emissions for radiological pollutants -- a goal that has been articulated by the International Joint Commission for all persistent toxic materials entering the Great Lakes, including radioactive materials having a half-life of more than six months. These would certainly include tritium, with its 12 year half-life, carbon-14, with its 6,000 year half-life, and cesium-137, with its 30-year half-life.

    2. Yet there is no discussion  by Ontario Hydro of "measures that are technologically and economically feasible and that would mitigate any significant adverse effects of the project", possibly "in combination with other projects that have been or will be carried out." (CEA Act, s. 16(1).)

    3. Ontario Hydro routinely compares radiation exposures resulting from activities at BNPD with so-called "background levels", which are taken to include all sources of radiation exposure other than Ontario Hydro nuclear stations. In section 3.6.4 of the EA, recent (1997) Hydro calculations are cited indicating that, on average, a typical Ontario resident is exposed to 3,300 microsieverts (330 millirems) per year, of which 2,000 microsieverts is from natural sources (including 1,000 microsieverts from radon exposure) and 1,300 microsieverts is from human-made sources (including bomb fallout, medical exposures and technological products and services).

    4. We find it strange that Hydro should include medical exposures and other technologically-related exposures as "background" in the context of an environmental assessment. This important methodological assumption is not justified by the authors of the Comprehensive Study . We do not believe this assumption is warranted or useful.

    5. If exposures of human origin are excluded from the calculation, Hydro's background radiation figure is immediately reduced by 40 percent , from 3,300 to 2,000 microsieverts per year. In this way, Hydro's contribution to total radiation exposure in the region is measured against natural background radiation levels rather than technologically enhanced levels. If we were to exclude radon from the calculation as well, on the grounds that radon is a highly specific internal alpha-emitter whose effects are concentrated on a specific organ, namely the lung, then natural background radiation drops to 1,000 microsieverts per year -- 70 percent less than the 3,300 microsieverts per year used by Hydro as ''background'' .

    6. In any event, generalized comparisons with "background radiation" are not helpful in assessing the degree to which specific radionuclides released into the natural environment by BNPD are affecting humans, animals and fish in the region. Much more useful would be a series of explicit measurements comparing (for example) elevated tritium levels with background tritium levels; elevated carbon-14 levels with background carbon-14 levels; elevated cesium-137 levels with background cesium-137 levels; and so on.

    7. For cesium-137, there is no "natural" (i.e. pre-fission) background level; in that case Hydro's contribution can be compared with the contribution from atomic bomb fallout -- the only other component of human-made radiation which has, unfortunately, left an indelible environmental footprint on the earth. In the case of tritium and carbon 14, there is both a natural background component (cosmogenic radiation) and another component that comes from bomb fallout; in such cases, comparisons can be made both ways.

    8. Radioactive materials, like toxic chemicals, have their own peculiar physical, biological and chemical properties, and in the case of internal emitters, they pose their own unique biological hazards. Inside the body, iodine-131 has an entirely different spectrum of effects than either radon or radium has, and these are all quite different in their effects from those of tritium or carbon-14. It thus makes little scientific or medical sense to treat them as more-or-less interchangeable aspects of the same phenomenon. Radionuclides should be tracked and assessed individually, just as we track and assess individual toxic chemicals.

    9. In some cases, the term "background levels" can be highly misleading, because they may refer not to natural background levels, but to background levels in an already polluted environment. One can see an example of this in the 1994 internal Ontario Hydro study on tritium levels in drinking water cited earlier:

        "Tritium concentration is measured in terms of radioactivity per unit volume: Becquerels per litre, or Bq/l. The maximum allowable concentration in drinking water set by the Atomic Energy Control Board is 240,000 Bq/l. The Ontario Ministry of the Environment limit is 40,000 Bq/l, and the Ministry is considering lowering this limit to 7,000 Bq/l. In the data we examined, all the concentrations are well below 1,000 Bq/l.

        Naturally occurring tritium as measured at control locations across Ontario is approximately 10 Bq/l. Ontario Hydro has already adjusted this data for naturally occurring tritium concentration. Thus the term ''background'' used in this report refers to the elevated levels of tritium that can be attributed to the normal operation of the NGS's but not to any sudden large emissions."

    10. Thus, chronic levels of pollution can come to be portrayed as part of the "background". This is routine practice when it comes to radioactive fallout from atomic bomb tests. It is a "slippery slope", however, which ultimately leads to the unacceptable position that any degree of pollution or radioactive discharges can become acceptable over time .

    11. According to the linear hypothesis, which has been adopted by regulatory bodies around the world, including the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), and which has been supported by such scientific bodies as the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the US National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR), there is no safe dose of radiation exposure -- except zero. According to this hypothesis, every extra dose of radiation, however small, adds to the incidence of radiation-induced cancer or genetic damage in an exposed population of people or animals.

    12. For this reason, the UN Scientific Committee has said that radiation protection policies are supposed to be based on "the principle of eliminating any exposures which are not necessary and of keeping all doses as low as is reasonably achievable" (UNSCEAR 1977 p.14). While the ALARA principle (to keep doses "as low as reasonably achievable") is discussed by Ontario Hydro (EA (1997), s. 3.6.1), the principle of eliminating any exposures which are not necessary (identified by UNSCEAR) is never discussed in the Comprehensive Study , the EA or the Addendum to the EA (1998), as far as we can determine. And although Ontario Hydro is required by law to deal with cumulative effects, there is almost no discussion of cancer or genetic damage in any of the documentation we have reviewed . It is true that cancer and genetic effects are mentioned briefly on one page (p. 123) in EA s. 4.8.2, but there is no mention of these effects at all in EA s. 4.6.1.3: "Radiation Effects on General Public", or EA s. 4.6.1.4 : "Radiation Effects on Aboriginal People", or EA s. 4.6.1.5 : "Ecological non-Human Effects". Nor is there any discussion of other types of radiation damage.

    13. The Chippewas of Nawash believe that the without a commitment to eliminate all unnecessary exposures, the ALARA principle rings hollow. Although Ontario Hydro states (EA (1997), s. 3.6.3) "The objective of maintaining or reducing exposures to as low as reasonable achievable is the cornerstone of radiological protection programs." Yet, in the same 1994 internal Ontario Hydro Report on tritium levels in drinking water already referred to, we read the following:

        "Release of radioactive material into the environment occurs primarily through leakage in two separate heat exchange systems: water from the reactor heats ordinary purified water and turns it into steam in the primary heat exchange system. Once the steam has gone through the turbine, it is further cooled by lake water in another heat exchange system. The latter leaks quite frequently, so if there is a leak in the primary system, it is virtually guaranteed that some of the leakage will end up in the lake.

        When such a leak occurs, tritium levels measured at a WSP can be anywhere from 5 to 40 times the background levels. These high concentrations usually last for one or two measurement periods and appear as sharp peaks in time series plots. There is no regular pattern to the occurrence of these leaks, although a reactor with a leak is more likely to be allowed to continue to operate during high demand times in the middle of winter, thus making the leakage periods roughly seasonal....

        Management philosophies at the two stations are also different: at Pickering NGS, several units were shut down, starting in 1988, for extended periods of time in order to inspect the primary heat exchangers and to plug tubes with significant wall loss before they started to leak. This may well be the reason for not seeing any major peaks in the Scarborough series after 1988. At Bruce A and B, however, the objective has been to keep the units running for as long as possible, tolerating minor leaks until they reached certain levels. Scheduled inspections and repairs were done, but not to the same extent as at Pickering. Thus we continue to see occasional peaks reflecting spills at the two stations over the entire Port Elgin series."

    14. It appears from the above passages that certain "measures that are technologically and economically feasible and that would mitigate ... adverse effects" may not necessarily be adopted by Ontario Hydro -- or rather, they may be adopted selectively depending on the management philosophy at different stations. An independent federal assessment would allow for a critical examination of these practices and priorities.


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    VII. C.   "Critical receptors": pregnant women, foetuses, breast-fed babies not included  

    1. In calculating radiation dose to an individual, Ontario Hydro follows a methodology utilized by the ICRP [International Commission on Radiological Protection] whereby

        "... the three critical groups are defined as:

          (a) Infant A - An infant six months old living at the boundary of the facility and drinks [sic] fresh milk from local sources.

          (b) Infant B - Similar to Infant A except for drinking powdered formula reconstituted with tap water.

          (c) Adult - An adult living on the boundary of the facility.

        Detailed dose assessment procedures together with pathway parameters, critical group dose calculations methods and the calculation results of five nuclide groups (tritium, noble gases, Carbon-14, Iodine-131 and particulates) are given in Annual Ontario Hydro Reports.        "

      EA (1997), Section 3.6.4.1

    2. It is very puzzling and disturbing to us to see that neither a breast-fed baby, nor a foetus, nor a pregnant woman is considered to be a critical receptor. Yet a foetus is known to be more sensitive to radiation than an infant. In fact, a foetus is susceptible to an entirely different category of harm -- developmental ("teratogenic") effects -- in addition to the carcinogenic and genetic effects normally ascribed to ionizing radiation.

    3. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR 1988) has stated that the most probable type of developmental effect experienced by a foetus exposed to ionizing radiation in utero, is mental retardation -- yet this effect is nowhere mentioned in Ontario Hydro's Cumulative Effects Assessment, and would certainly not be experienced by any of the three critical receptors identified in Ontario Hydro's EA.

        "Mental retardation is the most likely type of developmental abnormality to appear in the human species. In essence, analysis as a function of time showed that the probability of radiation-induced mental retardation is essentially zero with exposure before 8 weeks from conception, is maximum with irradiation between 8 and 15 weeks, and decreases between 16 and 25 weeks."

        UNSCEAR, New York, 1988, p.37
        United Nations: Sources, Effects and Risks of Atomic Radiation

      [ UNSCEAR = U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. ]

    4. Apparently, mental retardation can result if a developing foetus is exposed to radiation at a time when the central nervous system and the brain are being formed. It appears that radiation-induced mental retardation may be a linear non-threshold effect -- one which depends on radiation dose in a linear or straight-line fashion, meaning that there is no absolutely safe dose; i.e., no dose so low that no retardation is experienced.

    5. We have seen that the U.S. National Academy of Sciences has reported:

        "In humans, mental retardation is the best documented of the developmental abnormalities following radiation exposure.... In those irradiated between weeks 8 and 15 the prevalence of mental retardation appeared to increase with dose in a manner consistent with a linear, non-threshold response although the data do not exclude a threshold."

        BEIR V, Washington, 1989, p.362
        U.S. National Academy of Sciences.
        Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation.

      [ BEIR Committee = Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. ]

    6. Nor is mental retardation (indicated by a smaller brain size) the only harmful developmental effect of pre-natal exposure to tritium. In 1980, even before mental retardation had been identified as a significant radiation-induced effect, the US National Academy of Sciences BEIR-III Committee reported:

        "Because tritium (hydrogen-3) is a potential pollutant from nuclear energy production, its effect on development [of unborn babies] has been the subject of a number of studies.

        Tritiated water (HTO) is a common chemical state of tritium, and it has easy and rapid access to living cells, including those of the embryo or foetus.

        HTO administered in the drinking water to rats throughout pregnancy produced significant decreases in relative weights of brain, testes, and probably ovaries ... and produced weight decreases in a number of organs at higher doses.

        The total damaging dose cannot yet be estimated. Relative brain weight was found to be reduced at only 0.3 rads per day (one microcurie per millilitre of drinking water) when exposure began at the time of the mother's conception.

        Even lower exposures (0.003 rads per day and 0.03 rads per day) have been implicated in the induction of behavioral damage, such as delayed development of the righting reflex and depressed spontaneous activity."

        BEIR-III, pp. 485-486

        "Until an exposure has been clearly established below which even subtle damage does not occur, it seems prudent not to subject the abdominal area of women of child-bearing age to quantities of radiation appreciably above background, unless a clear health benefit to the mother or child from such an exposure can be demonstrated."

        BEIR-III, Washington, 1980, p. 493
        U.S. National Academy of Sciences.
        The Effects on Populations of Exposure
        to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation        .

      [ BEIR Committee = Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. ]

    7. Even earlier, in 1977, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) published reviews of the scientific literature documenting a wide range of genetic damage and developmental defects caused by tritium exposure in experimental animals:

        "During the past few years, there has been a growing interest in the study of the biological effects of radioisotopes, particularly of plutonium-239 and tritium.

        A number of genetic and cytogenetic studies that have so far been carried out in mice demonstrate that these isotopes are capable of inducing dominant lethals   [ i.e. lethal mutations ] , chromosome aberrations and point mutations (for the last category, only the effects of tritium have been studied)....

        In view of possible levels of tritium release, not only from existing nuclear installations but also from contemplated controlled thermonuclear reactors, these data are of great relevance." (emphasis added)

        UNSCEAR 1977,
        Report to the United Nations:
        Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation.
        Annex H: Genetic Effects of Radiation        .

      [ UNSCEAR = U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. ]

    8. The Chippewas of Nawash are dismayed that none of the best-documented health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation -- cancer, genetic damage, and developmental defects including mental retardation -- are discussed at all in Ontario Hydro's Cumulative Effects Assessment. The regulatory standards seem more important than the people those standards are claimed to protect. Having now had an opportunity to examine the authoritative literature in this regard, we can have little or no confidence in the "comprehensiveness" of the "comprehensive" study as prepared by Ontario Hydro and approved by the atomic regulator and Responsible Authority (AECB).

    9. The Chippewas of Nawash believe that Ontario Hydro has failed to produce an adequate acceptable Cumulative Effects Assessment. The fact that the foetus and pregnant women are not regarded as critical receptors is perhaps indicative of something more profound -- an unwillingness on Hydro's part to acknowledge the possible biological effects of radioactive pollution emanating from its BNPD into our traditional waters.


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    VII. D.   Conclusions regarding the present cumulative effects assessment 


    1. In light of the foregoing information, particularly regarding the treatment of critical receptors in the Comprehensive Study , we are determined that these issues be openly and fully discussed. We hope and trust that the process will now afford us such a forum, through means of public hearings.

    2. We believe that this issue of cumulative assessment of radioactive contaminant discharges from the BNPD concerns all residents in the Bruce area, and indeed Ontario and elsewhere.

    3. The discussion of cumulative impacts in the Comprehensive Study is, we find to our concern, limited to mechanical and cursory mention, and descriptive treatment to varying degrees, of various spatial, temporal, radiological and socio-economic considerations. Most of the cumulative effects that are significant to us are minimized, and it is hard to believe from this analysis that the proposed UFDSF is part of a highly invasive, socially contentious and problem-plagued broader industry at all, and also that this assessment process is not disposed to a particular outcome.

    4. The actual assessment in the Comprehensive Study has been undertaken in isolation from full consideration of the environmental and social effects of the nuclear fuel cycle of which it is part. This nuclear fuel cycle obviously includes the production of nuclear waste in reactors at the Bruce Nuclear Power Development ("BNPD") and the subsequent permanent storage or "disposal" of nuclear waste elsewhere (for example in deep geological facilities), not to mention other aspects of the nuclear fuel chain from uranium mining to nuclear weapons.

    5. This failure to fully embrace cumulative analysis  is unacceptable to us, because the public and First Nations peoples must be made fully aware of how this proposal fits into the nuclear "big scheme of things". In addition, it is essential to us that these matters be assessed as a composite whole, which they obviously are, rather than at a disaggregated level.

    6. To our mind, the approach taken in the Comprehensive Study is similar to the idea of assessing the overall health of a person through thorough examination of one part of his body only, for example the lower gastro-intestinal tract, while merely mentioning in passing that the person has eyes, ears, limbs, hair and other body parts and systems. Such an approach may yield interesting results. However it is clear to us that without a full physical, psychological, spiritual and social examination, including his interaction with his environment, family and community, one cannot possibly gain a full and accurate understanding of the person's real health.

    7. This is our understanding of the intent of the requirement for cumulative assessment in the CEA Act, namely to consider things as a whole. That requirement is consistent with our approach to the environment, our traditional laws, and respect for the Earth.

    8. To approach this proposed facility in such a disaggregated manner and thereby ignore or overrule our concerns is not only likely to bring the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act into disrepute among our people, but also to compel us to express our concerns about this proposal in whatever other forums we can access that may be more responsive. Our economic and cultural survival is too important for us to permit our concerns on respect of the full range of cumulative assessment of such a long-lived and invasive undertaking, in our traditional lands and waters, to be ignored. 


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    VIII.   ISSUES RELATED TO THE NORMAL AND ABNORMAL OPERATION OF THE BUFDSF


    VIII. A.   Nature of High-Level Radioactive Waste 


    1. We have come to understand that the safe and secure long-term storage of irradiated nuclear fuel ranks in the forefront of unsolved human problems. We have learned that irradiated nuclear fuel contains a bewildering variety of extremely toxic radioactive materials, most of them artificial (that is, not existing in nature in any measurable amounts prior to the advent of nuclear fission). We have read that this mix of radioactive poisons is capable in principle of killing or injuring an enormous number of people, and that it will remain dangerous for periods of time that dwarf the span of human history. The radionuclides in irradiated fuel are also potentially harmful to other living things, and hence to our mother the Earth. We wondered: where do all these artificial radioactive materials come from? A brief explanation would seem to be in order, even if it is a bit technical. However none is given in Ontario Hydro's documents.

    2. We understand that, before it is used as fuel in a nuclear reactor, a CANDU fuel bundle is not so dangerous. A fresh CANDU fuel bundle consists of a large number of uranium pellets stacked inside dozens of hollow metallic rods (called "fuel sheaths") which are then welded shut. These rods (or "fuel elements") are in turn welded together to form a metallic assembly -- a CANDU fuel bundle, about the size of a fireplace log. A fresh CANDU fuel bundle is not intensely radioactive. Most of its radiation, due to the presence of uranium, is alpha radiation, which -- while dangerous inside the body -- cannot even penetrate through a sheet of paper and thus poses no external radiation hazard. Only a small amount of penetrating radiation is given off by fresh fuel bundles; they can therefore be safely handled for short periods of time.

    3. Inside the nuclear reactor, however, the fuel bundles are bombarded with neutrons, causing violent and dramatic changes to take place in the subatomic structure of the uranium pellets and of the zirconium sheaths:

      • Many of the uranium-235 atoms are split or fissioned, resulting in the production of dozens of different kinds of radioactive materials called "fission products". Some of these are gases and vapours, and a portion of these migrate into the "gap" -- the space between the uranium fuel pellets and the zirconium sheath. (If the sheath is damaged, they are released.)

      • Many of the uranium-238 atoms absorb one or more neutrons without splitting; these atoms then undergo further radioactive transmutations to become transuranic elements (transuranic means heavier than uranium), often referred to as actinides: isotopes of plutonium, neptunium, americium, curium, et cetera, and their decay products. The actinides also include isotopes of uranium and thorium and their decay products.

        (Some of the plutonium atoms formed in the core of the reactor undergo fission, resulting in additional fission products.)

      • Many of the manufacturing impurities in the fuel absorb one or more neutrons, transforming them into radioactive materials called "fuel impurity activation products".

      • Many of the materials in the zirconium sheath (including impurities) absorb one or more neutrons, thereby becoming transformed into radioactive materials called "zircaloy activation products". This process also embrittles the sheath, making it more susceptible to the formation of pin-holes, cracks, blisters, and other defects, which may allow radioactive materials from the fuel to escape from the bundle.

    4. We now know that there are four kinds of atomic radiation: alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron. Gamma rays and neutrons are highly penetrating forms of atomic radiation; alpha rays and beta rays are not. Penetrating radiation is a hazard at a distance, requiring no direct contact to cause harm. Non-penetrating radiation requires quite close contact -- often internal to the body (inhaled, ingested, or absorbed through the skin) or on the outside surface of the body (e.g. skin contact or eye contact, esp. for beta emitters). For example, tritium is a beta emitter, and as such it is almost entirely an internal hazard. On the other hand, krypton-85 is a gamma emitter, so it is an external hazard as well as an internal hazard. Fission products are gamma and beta emitters, while many of the actinides (but not all) are alpha emitters.

    5. We wish to challenge Ontario Hydro's tendency to compare all radiation exposures to "background" radiation exposure. To the best of our knowledge, the natural background levels of fission products such as cesium-137, iodine-131, strontium-90, or actinides like plutonium-239 are ZERO. The fact that these materials have been disseminated into the environment by detonation of atomic bombs does not make them natural or acceptable. Each radionuclide has its own unique biochemical properties, making each one a unique hazard which should not be trivialized by inappropriate arithmetic.

    6. Ontario Hydro's documentation communicates no appreciation of this sense of great potential danger associated with irradiated nuclear fuel. Ontario Hydro seems to regard the problem of storing irradiated nuclear fuel, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, as an elaborate but straightforward technological matter, posing little or no potential threat to health, safety or the environment. The Chippewas of Nawash find Hydro's attitude disquieting. We believe that decisions regarding the storage of such dangerous materials, either on a temporary or permanent basis, requires the widest possible public debate.

    7. Accordingly, an independent environmental assessment conducted by a panel with public hearings is needed in connection with Ontario Hydro's proposal to store irradiated fuel from the Bruce A and B reactors in above-ground dry storage containers outside the confines of the respective reactor buildings.


    . . . back to [ TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

    VIII. B.   The Inventory of Radioactive Poisons in a Used Fuel Bundle 


    1. Exactly how many different radioactive poisons (or "radionuclides") are contained in one of these dry storage containers? Ontario Hydro addresses this question by stating that :

        "Each BDSC   [ BDSC is a Bruce Dry Storage Container ]   contains 600 used fuel bundles; 25 trays with 24 bundles in each tray. The radionuclide inventory in each container was calculated using ORIGEN S   [ ORIGEN-S is the name of a computer program used in the nuclear industry to predict the kinds and quantities of radioactive materials to be found in irradiated fuel at any time ]   and is listed in Tables 3-1 and 3-2."

        Section 3.1.4, 1997 Safety Report

    2. Table 3-1 of Hydro's Safety Report, entitled "Fission Product Inventory of one BDSC", lists 56 different radioactive substances.

      Table 3-2 of the Safety Report, entitled "Actinide Inventory of one BDSC", lists 39 other radioactive substances.

      Thus Ontario Hydro identifies a total of 95 different radioactive poisons, each of them having its own unique set of chemical and biological properties. For example,

        radioactive strontium-90 is chemically similar to non-radioactive calcium, and when it enters a living body, it goes wherever calcium normally goes -- to the bones, the teeth, and the milk; strontium-90 can cause bone cancer and blood disorders, and is easily passed on to a nursing infant.

        Radioactive iodine-129 behaves chemically like ordinary non radioactive iodine; it goes to the thyroid gland (in the throat), where it can cause cancer and a variety of other medical conditions, including developmental problems in young children.

        Radioactive cesium-137 behaves like potassium, so it goes to the fleshy parts of fish and animals.

      These particular substances (strontium-90, iodine 129, cesium-137) are biologically and chemically active, as well as radioactive; they tend to concentrate in food chains and to accumulate in the bodies of creatures which ingest food contaminated with these substances.

    3. As it happens, Ontario Hydro's radioactive inventory in its EA is far from complete . A document published in August 1989 by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL-9881) lists 211  different radioactive poisons contained in a typical ten year old fuel bundle from a Bruce A reactor, using the same assumptions and the same "ORIGEN-S" computer code as Hydro (see "Appendix 2" to this report). Thus, using the same assumptions and tools, AECL lists over twice as many (2.22 times as many) different radioactive substances as does Hydro; and AECL indicates that even its lists (which are summarized in the information below) are themselves not necessarily complete.

    4. The following chart identifies 211 radioactive poisons which are present in every ten-year old irradiated CANDU fuel bundle. The list is not a complete one. These data, compiled from AECL-9881, refer to the radioactive contents of irradiated fuel from the Bruce A reactors.

    5. The origin of each radioactive poison is indicated in the chart below:

      • F.P. indicates ''Fission Products'': these are the broken pieces of atoms which were split or fissioned in the reactor to produce energy.

      • F.I.A.P. indicates ''Fuel Impurity Activation Products'': during fission, impurities in the fuel become radioactive by absorbing neutrons.

      • Z.A.P. indicates ''Zircaloy-4 Activation Products'': elements in the zirconium sheath also become radioactive by absorbing neutrons.

      • ''Actinides'' refer to the radioactive decay products of uranium and the trans-uranium (heavier-than-uranium) elements created during fission, when uranium atoms absorb one or more neutrons.

      In the chart,

      • a single yen-sign   ¥   indicates the presence of a particular radioactive poison;

      • a triple yen-sign   ¥ ¥ ¥   indicates the presence of over a million becquerels of that radioactive poison
          - per kg of uranium fuel (for FP, FIAP, and Actinides) or
          - per kg of zirconium alloy (for ZAP).

      The list is organized according to the electric charge of the nucleus (the so-called "atomic number"), from the smallest charge (Hydrogen-3, also known as "tritium") to the largest charge (Californium-252).

      Within each chemical species, the radioactive varieties (called "isotopes" or "nuclides") are organized according to the mass of the nucleus (indicated by the accompanying number in the chart, called the "mass number").

      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      HHydrogen
      (Tritium)      		3¥ ¥ ¥¥¥ 
      BeBeryllium10 ¥¥ 
      CCarbon14 ¥ ¥ ¥¥ ¥ ¥ 
      SiSilicon32 ¥¥ 
      PPhosphorus32 ¥¥ 
      SSulphur35 ¥  
      ClChlorine36 ¥  
      Ar
      Ar      		Argon
      Argon      		39
      42      		 ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥      		 
      K
      K      		Potassium
      Potassium      		40
      42      		 ¥
      ¥      		 
      Ca
      Ca      		Calcium
      Calcium      		41
      45      		 ¥
      ¥      		 
      ScScandium46 ¥  
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      VVanadium50  ¥ 
      MnManganese54 ¥¥ ¥ ¥ 
      Fe
      Fe      		Iron
      Iron      		55
      59      		 ¥ ¥ ¥¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		 
      Co
      Co      		Cobalt
      Cobalt      		58
      60      		 ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		 
      Ni
      Ni      		Nickel
      Nickel      		59
      63      		 ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		 
      ZnZinc65 ¥¥ 
      SeSelenium79¥ ¥ ¥   
      Kr
      Kr      		Krypton
      Krypton      		81
      85      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		   
      RbRubidium87¥   
      Sr
      Sr      		Strontium
      Strontium      		89
      90      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥      		 
      Y
      Y      		Yttrium
      Yttrium      		90
      91      		¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		¥¥
      ¥      		 
      Zr
      Zr      		Zirconium
      Zirconium      		93
      95      		¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥      		¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		 
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      Nb
      Nb
      Nb
      Nb
      Nb      		Niobium
      Niobium
      Niobium
      Niobium
      Niobium      		92
      93m
      94
      95
      95m
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      MoMolybdenum93 ¥¥ 
      TcTechnetium99¥ ¥ ¥¥¥ 
      Ru
      Ru      		Ruthenium
      Ruthenium      		103
      106      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		   
      Rh
      Rh      		Rhodium
      Rhodium      		103m
      106      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		   
      PdPalladium107¥ ¥ ¥   
      Ag
      Ag
      Ag
      Ag
      Ag      		Silver
      Silver
      Silver
      Silver
      Silver      		108
      108m
      109m
      110
      110m      		¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      Cd
      Cd
      Cd
      Cd      		Cadmium
      Cadmium
      Cadmium
      Cadmium      		109
      113
      113m
      115      		¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		¥¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      In
      In
      In
      In      		Indium
      Indium
      Indium
      Indium      		113m
      114
      114m
      115
      ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      Sn
      Sn
      Sn
      Sn
      Sn
      Sn
      Sn      		Tin
      Tin
      Tin
      Tin
      Tin
      Tin
      Tin      		113
      117m
      119m
      121m
      123
      125
      126
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      Sb
      Sb
      Sb
      Sb      		Antimony
      Antimony
      Antimony
      Antimony      		124
      125
      126
      126m      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		 ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		 
      Te
      Te
      Te
      Te
      Te      		Tellurium
      Tellurium
      Tellurium
      Tellurium
      Tellurium      		123
      123m
      125m
      127
      127m      		¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      IIodine129¥ ¥ 
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      Cs
      Cs
      Cs      		Cesium
      Cesium
      Cesium      		134
      135
      137      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		   
      BaBarium137m¥ ¥ ¥   
      LaLanthanum138¥   
      Ce
      Ce      		Cerium
      Cerium      		142
      144      		¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		   
      Pr
      Pr      		Praesodymium
      Praesodymium      		144
      144m      		¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		   
      NdNeodymium144¥   
      PmPromethium147¥ ¥ ¥   
      Sm
      Sm
      Sm
      Sm      		Samarium
      Samarium
      Samarium
      Samarium      		147
      148
      149
      151      		¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥      		  
      Eu
      Eu
      Eu      		Europium
      Europium
      Europium      		152
      154
      155      		¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥      		¥
      ¥
      ¥      		  
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      Gd
      Gd      		Gadolinium
      Gadolinium      		152
      153      		¥
      ¥      		¥
      ¥      		  
      Tb
      Tb      		Terbium
      Terbium      		157
      160      		 ¥
      ¥      		  
      DyDysprosium159 ¥  
      HoHolmium166m¥¥  
      Tm
      Tm      		Thulium
      Thulium      		170
      171      		 ¥
      ¥      		  
      Lu
      Lu
      Lu      		Lutetium
      Lutetium
      Lutetium      		176
      176
      176      		  ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      Hf
      Hf
      Hf      		Hafnium
      Hafnium
      Hafnium      		175
      181
      182      		  ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      Ta
      Ta      		Tantalum
      Tantalum      		180
      182      		  ¥
      ¥      		 
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      W
      W
      W      		Tungsten
      Tungsten
      Tungsten      		181
      185
      188      		  ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      Re
      Re      		Rhenium
      Rhenium      		187
      188      		  ¥
      ¥      		 
      OsOsmium194  ¥ 
      Ir
      Ir
      Ir
      Ir      		Iridium
      Iridium
      Iridium
      Iridium      		192
      192m
      194
      194m      		  ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥      		 
      PtPlatinum193  ¥ 
      Tl
      Tl
      Tl
      Tl      		Thallium
      Thallium
      Thallium
      Thallium      		206
      207
      208
      209      		  ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Pb
      Pb
      Pb
      Pb
      Pb
      Pb
      Pb      		Lead
      Lead
      Lead
      Lead
      Lead
      Lead
      Lead      		204
      205
      209
      210
      211
      212
      214      		  ¥
      ¥

      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      Bi
      Bi
      Bi
      Bi
      Bi
      Bi
      Bi      		Bismuth
      Bismuth
      Bismuth
      Bismuth
      Bismuth
      Bismuth
      Bismuth      		208
      210
      210m
      211
      212
      213
      214      		  ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Po
      Po
      Po
      Po
      Po
      Po
      Po
      Po      		Polonium
      Polonium
      Polonium
      Polonium
      Polonium
      Polonium
      Polonium
      Polonium      		210
      211
      212
      213
      214
      215
      216
      218      		  ¥¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      AtAstatine217   ¥
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      Rn
      Rn
      Rn      		Radon
      Radon
      Radon      		219
      220
      222      		   ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Fr
      Fr      		Francium
      Francium      		221
      221      		   ¥
      ¥
      Ra
      Ra
      Ra
      Ra
      Ra      		Radium
      Radium
      Radium
      Radium
      Radium      		223
      224
      225
      226
      228      		   ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Ac
      Ac
      Ac      		Actinium
      Actinium
      Actinium      		225
      227
      228      		   ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Th
      Th
      Th
      Th
      Th
      Th
      Th      		Thorium
      Thorium
      Thorium
      Thorium
      Thorium
      Thorium
      Thorium      		227
      228
      229
      230
      231
      232
      234      		   ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      Pa
      Pa
      Pa
      Pa      		Protactinium
      Protactinium
      Protactinium
      Protactinium      		231
      233
      234
      234m      		   ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      U
      U
      U
      U
      U
      U
      U
      U      		Uranium
      Uranium
      Uranium
      Uranium
      Uranium
      Uranium
      Uranium
      Uranium      		232
      233
      234
      235
      236
      237
      238
      240      		   ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      Np
      Np
      Np
      Np
      Np      		Neptunium
      Neptunium
      Neptunium
      Neptunium
      Neptunium      		237
      238
      239
      240
      240m      		   ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Pu
      Pu
      Pu
      Pu
      Pu
      Pu
      Pu
      Pu      		Plutonium
      Plutonium
      Plutonium
      Plutonium
      Plutonium
      Plutonium
      Plutonium
      Plutonium      		236
      238
      239
      240
      241
      242
      243
      244      		   ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)
      Am
      Am
      Am
      Am
      Am      		Americium
      Americium
      Americium
      Americium
      Americium      		241
      242
      242m
      243
      245      		   ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      Cm
      Cm
      Cm
      Cm
      Cm
      Cm
      Cm
      Cm      		Curium
      Curium
      Curium
      Curium
      Curium
      Curium
      Curium
      Curium      		242
      243
      244
      245
      246
      247
      248
      250      		   ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥ ¥ ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Bk
      Bk      		Berkelium
      Berkelium      		249
      250      		   ¥
      ¥
      Cf
      Cf
      Cf
      Cf      		Californium
      Californium
      Californium
      Californium      		249
      250
      251
      252      		   ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      ¥
      Standard Chemical SymbolCommon Name of elementAtomic Mass
      Number      		F.P.
      Fission
      Product      		F.I.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Z.A.P.
      Activation Product      		Actinide
      (includes progeny)

      AECL-9881. J. C. Tait, I. C. Gould, and G. B. Wilkin.
      Derivation of Initial Radionuclide Inventories for the
      Safety Assessment of the Disposal of Used CANDU Fuel      .
      AECL Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment, August, 1989.

      . . . back to [ TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

    6. The above information discloses a remarkable discrepancy; yet nowhere in the Comprehensive Study, or Safety Report, or elsewhere, as far as we can determine, does Ontario Hydro indicate that its published inventory of radionuclides is incomplete. Such a casual treatment of the truth does not inspire confidence in Hydro's thoroughness, and tends to cast doubt on Hydro's other assertions and arguments in relation to the dry storage proposal. An independent environmental assessment will help to determine what other information is being totally or partially withheld by Hydro.

    7. AECL lists 11 more fission products in ten-year old irradiated fuel than Hydro does, for a total of 67; and 47 more actinides, for a total of 86. In addition, AECL includes two entire categories of radioactive poisons which are nowhere mentioned by Ontario Hydro: Fuel Impurity Activation Products (49 radionuclides), and Zircaloy Activation Products (71 radionuclides). A federal environmental assessment should clarify the nature of the radioactive inventory in each Bruce Dry Storage Container.

    8. It is clear from the AECL and Ontario Hydro documentation that the precise inventory of radioactive substances (referred to as "the source term", since it is the source of any possible radioactive contamination) in ten-year old irradiated fuel is unknown, and that the ORIGEN-S computer code simply gives a mathematical approximation. In its December 1997 Environmental Assessment document, Ontario Hydro says

        "...uncertainties could arise from information gaps, for example, in the source terms for release calculations.... Source terms are important parameters to EA.... In radiological assessment, the gamma radiation levels and the radionuclide emissions in the accident scenarios will determine the radiation dose and subsequently the health risk levels. Although credible data from previous studies are used in this EA, some uncertainty remains."

        Section 5.4.1, EA (1997)

    9. And from the introductory section of AECL-9881, where the word "isotope" is used instead of "radionuclide":

        "It should be emphasized that all codes that have been used to predict isotopic concentrations or bulk properties of used fuel have not been developed from the viewpoint of long-term waste management, but rather to describe the neutronics of the reactor and bulk property behaviour for short times after fuel discharge from the reactor. For example, many isotopes that may be of importance from a waste management perspective have little or no importance for modelling reactor neutronics, or for predicting short-term decay heats or radiation fields.... Only limited analytical data are currently available for CANDU fuels and none are available for fuel cladding."

        AECL-9881, p. 6

    10. Without experimental verification, based on real data from actual ten-year old irradiated CANDU fuel, the predictions of these computer codes remain open to question. Basing the radiological portion of the environmental assessment solely on these codes along with various assumptions about what radionuclides can and cannot be released is not a sufficiently conservative approach. An independent assessment should identify the uncertainties and examine these assumptions to arrive at a more conservative approach.


    . . . back to [ TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

    VIII. C.   Potential Radioactive Releases from a Used Fuel Bundle 


    1. Having understated the radioactive inventory, the Ontario Hydro Safety Report goes on to say:

        "Thermal analysis of ten-year-cooled reference fuel for Bruce Dry Storage has shown the maximum fuel sheath temperature to be 167 o C. The only species volatile at this temperature are krypton (Kr-85) and tritium (H-3).... Release of these radionuclide vapours upon sheath failure is used to assess radiological safety in Chapter 4."

        Section 3.1.5, Safety Report

    2. All of Ontario Hydro's subsequent analyses of accident consequences and of releases of radioactivity to the environment are based on this assumption, stated repeatedly in the Safety Report and throughout the Environmental Assessment documents, that the only radioactive materials available for release from ten-year old irradiated fuel under normal or abnormal conditions are tritium and krypton -- and not even all the tritium and krypton, but only a small fraction: namely 0.0367 + 0.01209 = 0.04879 (Safety Report, s. 4.1.1).

      Comparing the total inventory of tritium and krypton with the total radioactive inventory of the spent fuel, we see that this "releasable" amount is less than 0.07 percent of the total radioactive inventory (see "Appendix 3" to this report). Thus Ontario Hydro assures us that 99.93 percent of the radioactive inventory, which includes 100 percent of all but 2 of the 211 radioactive substances contained in ten year old irradiated fuel, and over 95 percent of the rest, will never be released under any circumstances.

      This sweeping claim must be called into question, since many of the subsequent health, safety and environmental effects discussed by Ontario Hydro under normal and abnormal conditions are based in very large part on this claim:

        "The calculated free inventory available for release from one failed fuel element of reference fuel is 38,900,000 becquerels of tritium and 601,000,000 becquerels of krypton-85. Calculations of all public dose due to abnormal operation ... are based on these numbers."

        Section 4.6.2.1.1, EA (1997)

    3. The justification for the claim is given in two-and-a-half pages (section 3.1.5) in the Safety Report. The argument that excludes all other radionuclides from being released from ten-year old fuel begins with the words:

        "The chemical forms of radiologically significant nuclides that may be present in used fuel are as follows:..."

      . . . following which the discussion is limited to only 9 radionuclides other than krypton and tritium:

      • iodine-129 (2 paragraphs) ;

      • cesium-134,-135,-137 (1 paragraph for all 3);

      • strontium-89,-90 (1 paragraph for both);

      • ruthenium-106 (1 paragraph);

      • cerium-144 and europium-154 (3 paragraphs for both together).

      This discussion is very incomplete. There is no mention at all of such radiologically significant radionuclides as cobalt-60, technetium-99, plutonium-239, carbon-14, or any of countless other radionuclides in the irradiated fuel, nor is there any discussion of the 71 activation products in the zircaloy sheath, nor of radioactive corrosion products that might be contaminating the surface of the fuel sheaths or of the dry storage container itself.

    4. And what discussion there is, is not reassuring. For example, concerning iodine-129, a highly volatile substance, the Safety Report states:

        "MOST  of the investigations have concluded that ALMOST  all of the iodine in the fuel/sheath gap exist as CsI   [ cesium iodide ]  in the condensed and vapour phases. Since the free energy of formation of CsI is strongly negative, the reaction SHOULD  proceed to completion and ESSENTIALLY  all of the iodine SHOULD  participate in the reaction." (Emphases added.)

        Section 3.1.5, page 3-9, 1997 Safety Report

      The preceding quotation from the EA (1997) has so many qualifiers that it can hardly be used to justify a "conservative" assumption of zero emissions of iodine-129 from irradiated fuel bundles whose sheaths are damaged!

    5. Under a truly conservative approach, Ontario Hydro should assume emissions of iodine-129 and other volatiles in the event of a breach of containment accident, because Hydro has not provided adequate proof that volatile radio-isotopes -- in particular iodine-129, cesium isotopes, strontium isotopes, and technetium-99 -- can not be released to the environment under any accident conditions. These volatiles form vapours at elevated temperatures, yet Ontario Hydro has not discussed the possible effect of elevated temperatures on the roster of radio-isotopes available for release following loss of containment. At what temperature would cesium vapours first be given off by ten-year old irradiated fuel? We are not told. Once cesium vapours begin to form, do increases in temperature increase the emissions of cesium vapours? Do increases in temperature also increase the fraction of tritium and krypton available to be released? None of these questions are addressed.

    6. In Chapter 4 of the Safety Report, and corresponding sections of the EA, there is no discussion of particulate radioactive material being available for release under accident conditions. Yet in the event of potential accidents during loading or unloading of a container (inside the irradiated fuel bay), it is explicitly assumed by Ontario Hydro that airborne radioactive particulate contamination (over and above the radioactive gases and vapours that may be released) is a distinct possibility, and is even to be expected:

        "High Efficiency Particulate (HEPA) filters in the active ventilation system of the irradiated fuel bay (IFB) would remove all particulates from the air before it is discharged. Any particulate release or fuel fragments from broken bundles in the event of a tray dropping into the BDSC will, therefore, be contained within the DTE. Removing broken bundles from the container would require special tooling.... In the event of active ventilation failure in the IFB all fuel transfer operations will be suspended until the ventilation system becomes operational."

        Section 4.6.4.3, EA (1997)

    7. Yet there is, even in the Safety Report, a brief description of possible radioactive contamination products on the outside surfaces of the fuel sheaths that might be available for release under abnormal circumstances:

        "In addition to fission products and actinides contained in the fuel, radioactive corrosion products, formed by irradiation of material from reactor components, and deposited on the fuel during residence in the reactor, may be present on the outside of the fuel cladding. Fission products released from failed fuel in the reactor may also be present in highly variable amounts....

        Based on the average value of activity leached out from the surface deposits for four Bruce fuel bundles, the amounts of cesium-137, cesium 134, strontium-90 and cobalt-60 that could be available for release from the DSC (due to corrosion products) is smaller by at least 4 orders of magnitude compared with the amount of krypton-85 or hydrogen-3 [tritium] available for release in a container...."

        Safety Report, s. 3.1.7

    8. Nevertheless, no airborne radioactive particulate emissions from stored containers, even under the most severe accident scenarios, is considered -- even in the event of severe shocks or vibrations due to seismic activity or aircraft collisions, and despite the fact that the fuel bundles are loosely stored in trays without being fastened in place. Nor is there any HEPA filtration system available within the DSC to limit such emissions if they do occur. Of particular concern is the possible release of fine carbon-14 dust, such as that encountered during the retubing of the Pickering "A" reactors. In some cases, according to industry reports, Ontario Hydro workers tracked carbon-14 dust to their homes, and subsequently bed-clothes and some furniture had to be confiscated and treated as radioactively contaminated materials. Apparently the airborne carbon-14 dust was so fine that it remained suspended in the air for long periods of time, and escaped detection from normal radiation monitoring equipment; it was only when special equipment was brought in that the problem was recognized and addressed.

    9. With such a bewildering inventory of radionuclides present in the irradiated fuel, and with so many unknowns and uncertainties associated with this complicated mix of toxic materials, we question Ontario Hydro's assurances of radiological safety. Ontario Hydro bases its analyses of radioactive emissions on the assumption that the only radioactive materials available to be released from irradiated fuel bundles into the environment under normal or abnormal conditions are tritium (hydrogen-3) and krypton-85. We feel that this assertion must be questioned. Some corroborating evidence is provided in the next few paragraphs .

    10. There are reports of isotopes of iodine, cesium, strontium, cobalt, and many others escaping from damaged irradiated fuel bundles while they are still in the core of the reactor. There are reports of contaminated ion exchange resins that have filtered out radioactive materials (other than tritium or krypton) from the circulating water in spent fuel bays; these resins are then buried as radioactive waste. There are published analyses of a variety of radioactive materials (other than the two alone mentioned in the Comprehensive Study , tritium or krypton) leaking from irradiated fuel in a hypothetical geologic repository. In none of these circumstances are the radioactive materials limited to tritium and krypton.

    11. In view of this information, we question Ontario Hydro's claim that tritium and krypton are the only materials that can possibly escape from ten-year old irradiated fuel.

    12. We saw that in Europe, earlier this year, there were sensational revelations of serious radioactive contamination of railway cars, trucks, and transport flasks used to transport irradiated nuclear fuel from German nuclear power plants to England and France. Nuclear authorities knew about the contamination since the 1980s, but did not inform government officials or the public. The resulting scandal may have contributed to Germany's recently-announced resolve to phase out nuclear power. Evidently, the contamination from the German irradiated fuel was not limited to tritium and krypton. How can Ontario Hydro be sure that similar contamination will not occur during the handling and transport of Canadian spent fuel?

        "Reuters: April 12, 1998

        BONN - The German government on Thursday ordered a halt to all shipments of nuclear waste following reports that contaminated German waste had been transported to reprocessing plants in France and Britain.

        The Environmental Ministry said in a statement that the ban on all shipments of spent fuel rods from German nuclear power plants would remain in effect until operators of the plants can guarantee that there would be no more contamination.

        On Wednesday Environmental Minister Angela Merkel had issued an order suspending nuclear transports to Britain and France before the ban was extended to all transports within Germany as well.

        "There will be no further transport of spent fuel rods in Germany or to foreign reprocessing plants until technical means, such as an improved purification process before shipment, can ensure that the contamination does not take place," the statement said.

        Rail cars of German nuclear waste shipped to France showed spots of contamination up to 3,000 times the level considered acceptable, French officials said this month. Recent shipments to Britain's Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant showed much lower levels of contamination, but still above the norm.

        Merkel had said shipments would be suspended until the causes of the contamination had been determined. But opposition politicians had criticized the measure as insufficient and urged her to stop all shipments, the step taken on Thursday.

        Germany has no reprocessing plants of its own, and relies on the facilities in La Hague, France, and at Britain's Sellafield.

        State and federal officials met on Tuesday to pool information on the contamination cases, and the Environment Ministry said the investigation was continuing. All the containers passed radiation inspections before leaving Germany.

        Fact-finding meetings with nuclear transport and electricity industry representatives took place on Wednesday. Merkel said reactor operators admitted at the meeting knowing of the contamination since the mid 1980s, but that the ministry had first been informed by French authorities on April 24.

        The Westfaelische Rundschau newspaper, citing sources in the nuclear industry, reported on Wednesday that German authorities had been aware of the problem for a long time, but decided there was no public health risk and tried to handle the problem internally.

        The ministry confirmed that six German shipments to France showed small patches with radiation of up to 13,400 becquerels per square centimetre, compared with a standard tolerance level of four becquerels."

    13. We remember too that the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident happened more than ten years ago. A huge sarcophagus was built to contain any radioactive emissions, including atmospheric emissions, that might be given off by the irradiated nuclear fuel that melted into the ground at the time of the accident. The sarcophagus is now in a severe state of disrepair and large sums of money -- many hundreds of millions of dollars -- are being spent to rebuild the sarcophagus. Evidently there is international concern about how to prevent the possible release of many different kinds of radionuclides from the ten-year old irradiated Chernobyl fuel. Why is it that Ontario Hydro does not consider it possible that a wider variety of radionuclides might be released from ten-year old Bruce irradiated fuel?

        "Reuters: September 18, 1998

        LONDON - AEA Technology Plc of the UK is part of an international consortium that won a contract to help clean up the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in the Ukraine, the Independent newspaper reported on Thursday.

        The contract, worth around $5.0 million, involves improvements to the steel and concrete shelter covering the damaged Number 4 reactor, which caught fire in 1986 causing one of the world's worst nuclear accidents.

        AEA, a science and engineering services group that was spun off from the state-owned Atomic Energy Authority two years ago, is a 25 percent shareholder in the consortium, which partners France's SGN and JGC Corp of Japan.

        No one at AEA was immediately available for comment.

        British Nuclear Fuels Ltd and U.S. partner Morrison Knudsen also said earlier this month they had won a multi-million dollar deal to help monitor the reactor's sarcophagus and begin design work to make both the outside shell and the reactor inside environmentally safe.

        Cost estimates for shoring up the increasingly fragile sarcophagus - partly funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) - have been pegged by experts at around $760 million.

        Chernobyl's Number 4 reactor exploded in April 1996, sending a vast cloud of radioactive dust over parts of the Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and western Europe.

        Matthew Jones, London Newsroom +44 171 542 2198,
        london.energy.desk@reuters.com        "

    14. These reports from other highly industrialized states do not inspire confidence in the level of discussion of the Comprehensive Study submitted by Ontario Hydro.


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    VIII. D.   Accident Analyses 


    1. The accident analyses provided in the Safety Report are superficial. For example, the analysis of a container tipping over after being fully loaded merits four entire sentences:

        "If a container tips over after it has been prepared for storage, it will be uprighted using conventional equipment, surveyed and checked for damage of lid welds. Depending on the extent of damage, the container will be returned to the Dry Transfer Station and either welds will be repaired or the BDSC will be unloaded. If no damage is found, the container will be moved to the storage area. Records of any container damage and subsequent repairs will be kept for future reference when fuel is removed for permanent disposal."

        Safety Report, s. 4.3.5.6

    2. We are dealing here with a container weighing 74 tonnes empty, and 90 tons fully loaded (Safety Report, s. 3.2.1). Inside the container are 600 fuel bundles which are stacked in 25 trays, but which do not appear to be immobilized or prevented from being dislodged. The possibility of massive fuel damage under such circumstances seems to be at least worth mentioning.

    3. We have learned that at the Gentilly-2 NGS in Quebec, there have on several occasions been incidents in which individual fuel elements ("rods" or "pins" or "pencils") have literally fallen off a fuel bundle. This could happen on a very large scale if a container were to tip over and slam down on its side. Moreover, if there is an accumulation of broken fuel inside the container, the flow of coolant (in this case, helium gas) could be blocked, and overheating of the fuel could occur. Overheating, in turn, could lead to several other radioactive species vaporizing or otherwise becoming airborne, and therefore available for release. Moreover, if the Pickering type DSC is used as suggested in the Addendum to the EA (1998), then the lid will not yet be welded on during transport to the UFDSF; it will just be clamped on, unwelded.

    4. Similarly, although the crash of a small airplane into the Dry UFDSF is discussed as credible, along with an accompanying fire and explosion, there is no discussion of possible simultaneous damage to one or more of the containers, including breach of containment; possible tipping over of one or more of the containers, with damage to both the containers and the fuel inside; possible physical damage to the fuel bundles inside one or more containers even without tipping, because of the mechanical shock; possible overheating of the fuel inside one or more of the containers, thereby increasing (in both quantity and number) the inventory of radioactive volatile materials that could be released.

    5. Moreover, Ontario Hydro has disregarded the possibility of a larger aircraft crashing into the Dry UFDSF, although the size and number of commercial aircraft passing within the vicinity of the site could increase dramatically over the 50-year projected lifetime of the facility.

    6. From a common-sense perspective, we have to ask: what was the probability of a large commercial aircraft crashing at Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia? The perfunctory analysis performed by Hydro is unconvincing; it raises more questions than it answers. Yet Hydro maintains that even under such scenarios as these, the only radionuclides capable of being released to the environment are tritium and krypton. We question the validity of such an analysis. We require an adequate opportunity to further probe the validity of such an analysis.

    7. This scenario of lightning strikes on Dry Used Fuel Storage Containers is quite likely, given the frequency of thunderstorms, and tornados in the southwest of the Province and the region of BNPD:

        "Thunderstorms produce lightning and, on occasion, a tornado. In Southern Ontario, thunderstorms normally occur 20 to 25 days a year...."

    8. Hydro discusses this scenario in a superficial way, saying only that:

        "No public dose consequences are expected from this scenario as the facility will be equipped with appropriate lightning arrestors and grounding provisions to guard against lightning strikes."

        Section 4.3.3.3, 1997 Safety Report

    9. Our understanding is that lightning arrestors and grounding provisions do not prevent lightning strikes; on the contrary, a well grounded lightning protection system may attract more lightning strikes than would have otherwise occurred. The purpose of a lightning protection system is to conduct the electrical energy of the lightning stroke into the ground and away from the structure being struck. However, as the powerful electrical surge is being conducted into the ground, are there not significant electrical currents induced in metallic objects inside the structure? Could not such induced electrical phenomena increase the incidence of fuel sheath failures and the inventory of volatile radionuclides capable of being released?

    10. Will the lightning protection system for the Dry Storage Containers meet all the specifications in the applicable Ontario legislation (even though there is no legal obligation for Ontario Hydro to comply with the provisions of that Act)? The legislation requires independent grounding for significant metallic objects located inside a protected structure, and also requires that metallic objects in close proximity to each other be electrically connected. Have the containers ever been tested experimentally using simulated lightning, with simulated fuel bundles inside?


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    IX.   UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY HYDRO'S DESIGN CHANGES


    IX. A.   Ontario Hydro's Proposed Project for Assessment 

    1. In EA section 2.1, entitled "The Proposed Project", [EA = December 1997 Environmental Assessment Document] Ontario Hydro defined its proposal for the BUFDSF [BUFDSF = Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility] ; it is an extremely simple, uncomplicated design: dry storage containers, arranged in columns in the open air, sitting on concrete pads.

    2. Only three types of monitoring are described in section 2.1 ("The Proposed Project") :

      • radiation monitors incorporated into the perimeter fence;

      • security cameras incorporated into the security fence;

      • radiation monitoring of surface water diverted into ditches.

        EA (1997), s. 2.1: The Proposed Project

    3. Ontario Hydro's "reference design" for the BUFDSF, on which all subsequent discussions (in the EA and Safety Report) of environmental effects and all accident analyses are based, was spelled out in the December 1997 EA:

        "2.3   Reference Design for Environmental Assessment Purposes

        Preliminary evaluation ... based on factors which included environmental impact, resource use, public and worker exposure, community benefits, as well as operability and cost ... resulted in selection of the current reference design:

        • dry loading from the fuel bays directly into the dry storage containers;

        • 600-bundle dry storage container (BDSC-600) design, using trays;
          [BDSC = Bruce Dry Storage Container]

        • common services (welding, leak-testing, etc.) located at the generating stations;

        • on-site transporter similar to that being used at Pickering; and

        • a central dry storage facility located adjacent to existing RWOS2 facility, [RWOS2 = Radioactive Waste Operating Site #2 (at the Bruce nuclear complex)] with reference layout designed for up to 744,000 used fuel bundles in BDSC-600 containers.

        This reference design is used as the basis for the main (most detailed and quantitative) component of the environmental effects assessment in this report, as documented in Sections 4.1 to 4.8        ."

        EA (1997), s. 2.3

    4. From the beginning, however, Hydro made it clear that other types of DSC (Dry Storage Containers) could be used, and might be used -- even though they were not discussed or analyzed in the relevant sections of the report, and even though they had serious drawbacks compared with the reference design. At all times, Hydro gave assurances that the exact type of DSC made very little difference to environmental impacts or safety analyses, or to the design of the facility itself, except for the size of the BUFDSF:

        "2.2.3   Dry Storage Technologies

        All of the used fuel dry storage technologies considered will require a monitored storage area consisting of concrete pads, for stable emplacement of the containers, surrounded by a security fence. The size and design of the storage facility will depend on the number and type of containers to be stored."

        EA (1997), s. 2.2.3

    5. At no time in the section entitled "Project Description" does Hydro mention any other facilities at the BUFDSF -- regardless of the choice of DSC -- except the concrete pads, the DSCs, the transporter (mobile), a security fence, perimeter radiation monitors, perimeter security cameras, and a sampling point for runoff water.


    . . . back to [ TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

    IX. B.   Alternative DSC Designs Considered by Hydro 


    1. In the 1997 EA, four alternative DSCs are discussed; the "reference design" and three others.

      • Alternative 1 is the reference design, the BDSC-600.

      • Alternative 2 is an enlarged Pickering-type DSC, the BDSC-504.

      • Alternative 3 is the DSC currently in use at the Pickering NGS, the PDSC-384. [PDSC = Pickering Dry Storage Container]

      • Alternative 4 is AECL's CANSTOR Module.
        [AECL = Atomic Energy of Canada Limited]

      Ontario Hydro offers reasons for favouring the "reference design", Alternative 1, over the other DSC designs.

    2. Referring to Alternative 1 (the reference design), the EA states:

        "... this design may involve simpler construction and reduce storage life cycle cost, compared to the Pickering container system (Alternative 3). The circular lid design would be expected to reduce welding, testing and machining cost. A major advantage of this lid design is the simplification of the closure welding machine and welding process.

        This container is not designed for transportation off the BNPD site...." [BNPD = Bruce Nuclear Power Development]

        EA (1997), s. 2.2.3, pp. 10-11

    3. Referring to Alternative 2, the EA states:

        "The greater complexity of the Pickering type lid design, closure welding and leak-testing may lead to more costly fabrication and operation.... The BDSC-504 container would be about 16 percent less space efficient.... The increased payload (from 384 to 504 bundles) would affect the structure's structural integrity and, most importantly, the thermal load resulting from the increased heat input. The extra weight would require new accident analyses.... A redesigned suspension system for the transporter would also be required."

        EA (1997), s. 2.2.3, pp. 10-11

    4. Referring to Alternative 3, the EA states:

        "This alternative is the system currently being used at Pickering NGS.... [NGS = Nuclear Generating Station] In this alternative, if applied at Bruce, the fuel must first be transferred from the storage trays to modules before being loaded into the dry storage container....

        An obvious disadvantage of this alternative is that it would have a lower storage density (384 bundles vs. 600 for the BDSC), thus necessitating more storage containers and more storage space for a given quantity of used fuel. Preliminary analysis indicated that it may lead to higher initial operational and equipment costs, associated with transferring fuel from trays to modules, and thus higher total cost. The additional equipment may congest the storage bays and impact the impact the existing Cobalt handling operations in the fuel bays. In addition, wet loading would require upgrading of the fuel bay crane and installation of impact pads at the loading areas, inside and outside the bay...."

        EA (1997), s. 2.2.3, p. 11

    5. Referring to Alternative 4, the EA states:

        "This alternative is a dry storage design developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, involving convective vault technology instead of containers as in the other alternatives....

        A major disadvantage is the in-bay handling requirements needed to transfer fuel from trays into the baskets. At Gentilly, the fuel bundles are transferred individually into the baskets, a process which is very labour intensive, and the additional equipment in the bay creates considerable congestion.... The maintainability and reliability of this loading equipment is a concern to fuel handling personnel at Bruce."

        EA (1997), s. 2.2.3, p. 11

    6. Referring to the entire range of alternatives, the EA states:

        "The potential implications of new design alternatives which may come out of the current system design studies, as outlined in Section 2.2.4, are addressed in Sections 4.9 to 4.11. The overall conclusions in Section 9.0 are based on construction of both the reference design and foreseeable alternatives currently being studied."

        EA (1997), s. 2.3

    7. Unfortunately, there is no section 2.2.4 in the 1997 EA; the reference is presumably to section 2.2.3 (as indicated above). Moreover, sections 4.10 and 4.11 have nothing whatsoever to say about the "potential implications of new design alternatives". In actual fact, the only section in chapter 4 of the EA of any relevance to the question of alternative DSC choices is section 4.9.3 -- a total of five paragraphs of text, about a page and a half, out of a 159 page document. Thus, less than one percent of the EA is devoted to the implications of designs other than the reference design (and even less still if the appendices are taken into account).


    . . . back to [ TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

    IX. C.   Implications of Design Alternatives according to Hydro 


    1. Section 4.9.3 of the 1997 EA, entitled "Different Dry Storage Technologies", assures us that

        "All of the alternatives would have to meet the same technical performance criteria for safety and radiation protection as apply to the reference design".

      However, there is a great deal of uncertainty expressed as to which option will actually be employed:

        "Based on the scope of current design studies outlined in section 2.2.4,   [ sic ]   the potential design changes are EXPECTED to be LARGELY within the range of alternatives previously evaluated." (emphasis added)

        EA, s. 4.9.3, p. 125

    2. It is on page 126 that the key passages are to be found. They are as follows:

        "... the key system design aspects currently being considered (different from the current reference design) are:

        • wet loading at the station bays, as in the existing Pickering dry storage system;

        • tray-to-module conversion prior to loading;

        • 384-bundle containers using modules, similar to existing Pickering containers; and

        • common services (such as welding, leak-testing, inspection, etc.) centralized at the dry storage facility, as in the existing Pickering system.

        The main environmental implication of these potential design changes, as indicated in relation to the alternatives previously considered, is the reduced dry storage density associated with using smaller containers (Pickering DSC-384 instead of the reference Bruce DSC-600 design). This would require more storage space, for a given quantity of used fuel, and result in more on-site terrestrial environment disturbance and somewhat more frequent delivery of new containers from the off-site manufacturer. With the smaller container alternative, the current reference site layout .... would be sufficient in size if the Bruce A reactors are not returned from lay-up, and would probably be sufficient until at least the year 2015 if Bruce A is returned to service as presently planned .... As indicated in EA Section 2.1, an advantage of the proposed site location is the space available for expansion if required. The local community traffic effects associated with delivery of the smaller containers would still be relatively small. As project implementation is proposed to develop in stages .... there would be adequate opportunity in future to refine site development plans and appropriate environmental mitigation measures.

        The possibility of changing to a wet loading system (including tray-to module conversion) at the generating stations and co-location of common services at the dry storage facility are not expected to give rise to significantly different off-site environmental effects, compared to those associated with the current reference design. This general assessment is supported by the environmental and safety analysis documented in the Safety Report submitted to the AECB for approval of the first stage of the Pickering Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility (Ontario Hydro, 1994)."

    3. As far as we can tell, this is the only passage in the 1997 EA that suggests that the BUFDSF might include additional facilities for welding and leak-testing the DSCs. Of course, this also implies that the transporter will be carrying DSCs whose lids have not yet been welded. Why were these important changes, which could conceivably have safety or environmental implications, never mentioned anywhere else?

    4. In addition, it appears that this is the only passage in the 1997 EA that mentions a hitherto unprecedented operation -- the conversion of spent fuel bundles from trays to modules -- that might become part of the BUFDSF proposal. Yet there is no discussion of accident scenarios related to, or exposures or emissions that might result from such an activity. We trust that these matters will be included in any federal environmental assessment of the Hydro proposal.


    . . . back to [ TABLE OF CONTENTS ]

    IX. D.   Has Ontario Hydro Changed the Reference Design?  


    1. All of this would be of little importance, were it not for the fact that in the 1998 Addendum, Ontario Hydro seems -- quite suddenly, and without adequate explanation -- to be strongly favouring the Pickering wet-transfer technology (and associated PDSC-384 container). Indeed, it seems quite clear that this is now the "reference design", for all intents and purposes; or at least, that it has a high probability of being chosen.

        "2.   System Design Study Update

        Ontario Hydro's December 1977 EA submission ... was largely based on a preliminary system design ("reference design") developed earlier in the planning process for the project (including tray-type frames for holding the used fuel bundles, 600-bundle dry storage containers, and a dry loading system for transferring the used fuel trays from wet storage to dry storage). In addition, the EA considered the environmental implications, in more general terms, of a range of system design alternatives based on the terms of references for a more detailed system design study which was to begin in January 1998, after submission of the EA....

        ... wet transfer technology has several advantages over the dry transfer technology used as part of the "reference design" for the EA and preliminary Safety Report, including proven technology and processes, standardization of equipment, and maintainability....

        For moving the DSC from the two generating stations to the BUFDSF site, a transporter vehicle functionally similar to that used at the Pickering UFDSF is being considered, except that it would be towed instead of self propelled. Centralization of common services at the BUFDSF site (such as welding, leak-testing, inspection, etc.), as opposed to being distributed at the generating stations, has the efficiency advantages and reduces impact on station operations....

        The short-list of options now being evaluated, from which the preferred system design concept will be selected, is within the range of options considered in the December 1997 EA (EA sections 2.2.4, 4.9.2 and 4.9.3), except for the possible inclusion of a storage building. The EA did not consider such a building explicitly...."

        1998 Addendum to the EA, chapter 2

    2. If indeed the reference design has changed, then both the 1997 Safety Report and the 1997 EA are technically obsolete and largely irrelevant, and a new Safety Report and EA should be prepared by Ontario Hydro. (The necessity for this could have been avoided if Ontario Hydro had, in the existing documentation, simply given parallel but independent treatments for the different types of DSC that were being contemplated.)

    3. Ontario Hydro seems to argue that there is no need for a new Safety Report and EA , because (quoting section 4.9.3 of the 1997 EA, already cited) it is argued that:

        "the final system design is LIKELY to remain within the range of technology options ALREADY ASSESSED in the EA and/or implemented at the Pickering UFDSF. The recently updated Safety Report for the Pickering Waste Management Facility (June 1988) contains more detailed information on operating systems which is applicable for LATER safety assessment and licensing of the Bruce UFDSF project, including:

        • Overall storage building layout
          (incl. DSC processing and storage areas)

        • DSC processing facilities and services

        • on-site transportation from wet to dry storage

        • Storage area inside building

        • DSC design and performance

        • Safety analysis of the overall system." (Emphasis added)

          1988 Addendum to the EA, s. 2

    4. This rather astounding passage suggests that the original Safety Report and EA discussion is in fact quite irrelevant, because the game has changed rather profoundly, and the relevant documentation is to be found elsewhere -- namely in the Pickering Safety Report document cited above. We also learn that not only is a "storage building" to be considered, but that "DSC processing and servicing facilities" are to be housed in this same structure. A multitude of questions are unleashed by this remarkable turn-about on Hydro's part.

    5. The main question is:

        Why has the reference design suddenly changed?
        What is the rationale?

    6. The original reference design was characterized (in the 1997 EA) as preferable to all other alternatives "based on factors which included environmental impact, resource use, public and worker exposure, community benefits, as well as operability and cost". Was that assessment in the 1997 EA incorrect? Or has Hydro decided that other considerations are more important than those cited?

    7. Other questions come to mind. In the 1997 EA, it is stated that "The greater complexity of the Pickering type lid design, closure welding and leak-testing may lead to more costly fabrication and operation...." Has this changed? What about the "higher initial operational and equipment costs" and the problem of congestion in the storage bays? What about "upgrading of the fuel bay crane and installation of impact pads"? Why is there no explanation offered by Hydro to explain the reasons for its change of mind? The BUFDSF project is suddenly beset with uncertainties that go well beyond those laid out in part VIII of this commentary.


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    IX. E.   Information from the Pickering Safety Report 


    1. Baffled, we turned our attention to the 1998 Pickering Safety Report mentioned in the Addendum. (We were told by Ontario Hydro that the 1994 Pickering Safety Report, cited in the 1997 EA, is out of print and will not be re-issued -- it has been replaced by the 1998 document.) Our concerns grew as we read of the Pickering UFDSF operation, which raises a host of environmental and safety questions never even hinted at in the EA documents that we had been studying so earnestly.

    2. The main features of the Pickering UFDSF which we feel are most relevant are laid out in "Appendix 4" of this report and are also summarized immediately below:

      Summary of Features
      of UFDSF at Pickering

        Storage Building with

        • concrete shielding walls

        • DSC storage area,

        • offices,

        • shop,

        • welding area,

        • decontamination area

        • water supply

        • sewage system

        • instrument and service air

        • heating for shop and office area

        • air conditioning for office area

        • electric power

        • ventilation

        • battery of filters for airborne radioactivity

        • normal drainage

        • radioactive drainage

        • PA system

        • fire prevention and control

        • radiation monitoring equipment

        • surveillance cameras (inside building)

        • alarm systems

        • control room with control panel

        Ventilation

        • Workshop

          • exhaust fans

          • radioactive filter assemblies

            • demisters

            • prefilters

            • HEPA filters

        • Storage Area

          • breeze vents

            • covered to prevent the ingress
              of rain or snow

            • uncovered if the inside temperature
              becomes too high

        Fire Prevention

        • Three Hydrants within 15 m of access doors

          • north side

          • west side

          • south side

        Drainage

        • Welding and Decontamination Areas

          • floor drains

          • two underground steel-lined sumps
            for radioactive liquids

          • sump pumps

          • above-ground stainless steel holding tanks
            for active liquids

          • nuclear class underground stainless steel piping

            • leads to radioactive liquid
              waste treatment system at NGS

        Welding Area

        • Floor receives unloaded DSC from the transporter

        • Overhead crane

          • picks up lifting beam

          • lifts DSC using lifting beam

          • places DSC in welding station

        • Preparing the DSC robotically

          • Transfer clamp on DSC is removed

          • Vacuum system is connected to DSC drain port

          • Heaters are installed around DSC flange

        • Welding Operation

          • Welding equipment is installed on DSC

          • Weld is deposited in 7 layers with up to 11 passes

            • remotely operated from a control room

            • leading and trailing cameras track the weld puddle

            • alarms in case the welding torch gets too close to the side of the DSC

        • Sealing Operation

          • Welding equipment removed

          • Gases in DSC cavity are evacuated

          • DSC is backfilled with helium

          • Vent opening is plugged and welded

          • Drain opening is plugged and welded

          • Leak test is carried out

          • Affected areas are cleaned and painted

        • DSC is checked for surface contamination

          • Further decontamination is carried out if necessary

          • Permanent safeguards seals are installed

        Emissions Control, Contamination Control and Monitoring

        • Airborne emissions from welding area

          • Negative pressure maintained

          • Exhaust air is filtered

            • demisters

            • prefilters

            • HEPA filters

            • exhaust stack

          • Exhaust air is monitored

            • Continuous Air Monitor (CAM)
              in Welding Shop

        • Liquid Emissions from Operations Areas

          • collected in active liquid collection system

            • stainless steel sump tanks

            • sump pumps

            • stainless steel holding tanks

          • transferred to NGS active liquid waste management system

            • underground stainless steel piping

        • Decontamination Area Monitoring

          • equipment for contamination survey

          • interzonal monitors

        • Shop and DSC Storage areas

          • monitoring for possible surface contamination

            • portable contamination counters

            • smear counters

          • monitoring personnel, equipment, and material movements

            • inter-zonal head and foot monitors

            • inter-zonal radiation friskers




    IX. F.   The Need for an Independent Federal Panel Review 


    1. The information in the Pickering Safety Report is so far removed from what is proposed at the BUFDSF that we have no hesitation in calling for a completely new set of environment assessment documents and a whole new environmental assessment process. 

      • At Pickering we read about elaborate treatment for airborne radioactivity in the welding and decontamination areas -- something never even mentioned in the EA, the Safety Report, or the Addendum.

      • At Pickering we read of a Continuous Air Monitor to provide constant monitoring against airborne radioactivity;

      • At Pickering, we read of elaborate collection and treatment of run off water, through a series of high quality stainless steel tanks and pipes, just in case of any surface contamination that has gone unnoticed.

      • At Pickering we read about the possibility of radioactive particulate emissions, and the consequent use of HEPA filters to trap such radioactivity and prevent it from escaping into the environment.

      • At Pickering we read about extensive and repeated monitoring for surface contamination of the DSC, using portable contamination counters and "smear" counters;

      • At Pickering we read about head-and-foot personnel radiation monitors, and inter-zonal radiation monitors;

      • At Pickering we read of alarms, overhead cranes, heaters, tracking cameras, vacuum systems, exhaust stacks....

    2. At the Bruce UFDSF, in contrast, we have "a fence equipped with radiation monitors and security cameras", and surface run-off directed towards a sampling point near a drainage ditch. The differences between these two installations raises a great many questions based on a host of uncertainties.

    3. Under the provisions of the Act, the imperative of a federal environmental assessment process with an independent panel would seem to be inescapable.


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    X.   OTHER KEY ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE PRESENT "COMPREHENSIVE" STUDY


    X. A.   Purpose, use or capacity of the existing on-site generation facilities 


    1. It is stated in the EA (1997) (at s. 1.2) that:

        "The project is not intended to alter the basic purpose, use or capacity  of the existing on-site generation facilities. It is intended to allow these facilities to continue operating as planned and approved  ."(emphasis added)

      These statements are repeated in Ontario Hydro promotional material appended to the Comprehensive Study and elsewhere.

    2. These statements are seriously misleading. It is clear that the operation of the BNPD "as planned and approved" was predicated on the supposed availability of a "solution" for the permanent storage or management of high-level nuclear waste. At the outset, Ontario Hydro provided sufficient on-site storage facilities to accommodate only about one-half of the used nuclear fuel to be produced during the expected lifetime of the reactors. The proposal to now greatly augment the potential and actual quantity of such waste storage on-site is clearly a significant and unanticipated change in the purpose, use and capacity of the BNPD.

    3. The already planned and approved "purpose" and "use" to date of the BNPD was ostensibly one of nuclear generation of electricity through nuclear fission and subsequent temporary storage of high level nuclear waste; the already planned and approved "capacity" involved only the capacity of the generating plants and the wet nuclear waste storage pools inside them.

    4. The proposed additional dry storage facilities were certainly not  "planned and approved" -- or the present assessment process would be redundant. The BNPD is not just a set of eight reactors, to which various ancillary components are or can be added as required. The BNPD has also been inherently a nuclear storage facility, in which high-level radioactive wastes were held in wet storage within the containment structures, while other types of radioactive wastes have been stored in two waste management areas: RWOS-1 and RWOS-2   [ Radioactive Waste Operations Sites 1 and 2 ] . The purpose, use and capacity of BNPD is being significantly altered by virtue of the proposed facility.

    5. Moreover, the nature of the nuclear materials involved -- high level nuclear waste -- means that every aspect of the undertaking is critically important, and the multiplication of the quantities of waste stored onsite is a significant change to the purpose, use and capacity of the Bruce facilities.

    6. At worst, these statements are a deliberate effort at the outset of the exercise to mislead the public into believing that the present proposal is somehow exactly what was planned all along. At best, they are erroneous, but nevertheless prejudicial to accurate public perception.


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    X. B.   "Temporary storage"? 


    1. Ontario Hydro indicates that "dry storage technology is an appropriate interim measure until disposal..." (News Release, May 17 1996, EA (1997), Appendix E). It would thus appear that the "temporary" nature of the proposed dry UFDSF is predicated on a permanent management approach that is socially acceptable to the Canadian public and its subsequent siting, licensing, construction and completion.

    2. We ask:

        Is this temporary waste storage facility actually permanent storage (or will it turn out to be), because no permanent waste storage solution is yet in existence and may not come into existence for years or decades to come, if ever?

      We are very concerned that this may be the case, because no permanent high-level nuclear waste disposal site has been finalized in Canada and may well not be in the near (or even distant) future.

    3. In this regard, the recent federal impact assessment, conducted by the former Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, of the concept to bury high-level nuclear waste in geological formations in the Canadian shield indicated its finding, among others, that this concept is socially unacceptable to the Canadian public. It is the position of the Chippewas of Nawash that the burying of high level nuclear waste in the Canadian Shield (i.e. in another First Nation's backyard) is also not acceptable.

    4. It is stated by Ontario Hydro that the life of the proposed facility is up to fifty years. While to an aboriginal people such as the Chippewas of Nawash this is a short time period in universal terms, it also comprises two or more generations, or when viewed in light of the time the BNPD has been in our traditional lands, more than a human lifetime. In any case, as with other Aboriginal peoples, we are concerned with the impacts of all things we do for a period of "seven generations", that is essentially forever.

    5. We submit that under these circumstances, for all intents and purposes, the proposed facility constitutes a permanent installation, and the project should be assessed as such. To do otherwise is less than truthful.


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    X. C.   Operational status and future operation of BNPD 


    1. As is well known, part of the BNPD, Bruce A, was recently closed down, due to grave operational concerns regarding Ontario Hydro nuclear facilities throughout Ontario.

    2. Our people, the Chippewas of Nawash, have made no secret of the fact that we regard the presence in our traditional lands of nuclear waste (and thus of the continued operation of the BNPD) as an affront to our relationship with the Earth, our way of life, and our obligation of stewardship of our traditional lands and waters. This is acknowledged in the Comprehensive Study at EA (1997) s. 4.8.3 and also in the cumulative assessment section in Addendum to the EA (1998).

    3. In this context, we are obliged to question whether the construction and existence of this facility will in any way provide additional reasons to re-start presently closed-down Bruce A nuclear reactor capacity. This concerns us greatly, because we regard the closure, albeit temporary, of any part of the BNPD as a positive development. The failure of the comprehensive study to adequately assess the very real alternative of ceasing to produce nuclear waste at BNPD is unacceptable.  This is a further very important aspect of cumulative assessment that has not been dealt with.


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    X. D.   Social Effects Assessment: Burial Grounds 


    1. The addendum suggests (at p. 26) that the archaeological assessment determined that "the potential for archaeological sites was moderately low." However, this overstates the conclusion of the assessment which relied on indicators of suitability for habitation, not for burial sites. The assessment did not consider evidence of at least four Aboriginal burial grounds within the BNPD site. Therefore, the assessment cannot be considered technically adequate at the time it was undertaken.

    2. It is indicated in the Comprehensive Study that we have been involved in various activities concerning archaeological sites. Some of these activities have since been undertaken in conjunction with Ontario Hydro. There is however a possible implication that the attention paid to this social and spiritual issue is somehow an indicator of Chippewas of Nawash acceptance of the proposed Facility.

      This is not so .

      These activities to protect and preserve our ancestors' graves and our spiritual heritage are our right. They are also not a substitute for adequate assessment of the immediate and cumulative environmental effects of this proposed Facility. 


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    X. E.   Social Effects Assessment: Our Fisheries 


    1. As mentioned above, Ontario Hydro acknowledges that our relationship to the fishery is "of vital importance to [our] cultural and economic health" (p. 26). The Addendum to the EA (1998) asserts that the "radiological assessment found no significant effect on animals and plants that Aboriginal people may traditionally harvest around the BNPD site."

    2. The Lake Huron fishery is the focus of our harvesting activity. Ontario Hydro has failed to establish baseline data for radioactivity levels in Lake Huron fish, particularly lake whitefish.

    3. We share the concern expressed by AECB staff in a letter dated March 21, 1997 that "the sampling scheme [for Aquatic Environment, Raw Water] is not likely adequate to monitor releases that vary in level over time." We also share their concern that samples of neighbouring water supply plant intakes may not be representative "since there is dilution between the plant outflow and the intakes while fish may reside more proximal to the plant outflow". These concerns are not addressed by Ontario Hydro in the Addendum to the EA (1998).

    4. The Addendum to the EA (1998) does not provide adequate baseline data on the tritium concentration in Lake Huron fish. We know that tritium bioaccumulates. Testing "fish water" rather than fish tissue fails to assess bioaccumulation. Without reliable baseline data, effective monitoring of radiation effects cannot occur.

    5. It is indicated in the Comprehensive Study that we have been involved in various activities concerning whitefish sampling. There is a possible implication that the attention being paid to this social issue, including through sampling activities now being undertaken in conjunction with Ontario Hydro, is somehow an indicator of Chippewas of Nawash acceptance of the proposed Facility.

      This is not so.

      These activities to protect and preserve our subsistence and commercial fishery are our right. They are not a substitute for adequate assessment of the environmental effects of this proposed Facility.


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    X. F.   Radioactive contamination levels in fish rather than water; organically bound tritium 


    1. We now are aware that tritium and carbon-14 are chemically identical to ordinary hydrogen and carbon, which are the two basic building blocks of each and every organic molecule; thus they can become incorporated into any of the body's molecules. When this kind of molecular incorporation occurs, the tritium or carbon-14 is said to be "organically bound".

    2. Ontario Hydro's estimates of tritium concentrations in fish has generally been based on the assumption that the tritium concentration in the water where the fish are swimming will be the same as the tritium concentration in the body of the fish. But this assumption disregards a number of factors that might make a substantial difference, such as the mobility of the fish and the fact that the tritium can become organically bound.

    3. In the EA (1997) we learn (in connection with terrestrial biota) that:

        "Organically bound tritium is not routinely analyzed. Conservative dose conversion factors are used for critical group dose assessments which assume a contribution to the dose from ingesting organic bound tritium from locally grown food. "

        1997 EA, Section 3.6.3.6

    4. Given the fundamental importance of fish in the diet of our people, the importance of the commercial fishery to our livelihood, and our constitutionally entrenched treaty rights in this context, we are unconvinced that Ontario Hydro's dose calculations are appropriately conservative.

    5. The Chippewas of Nawash intend to rely in this regard, at a minimum, on direct measurements of tritium content in fish, including organically bound tritium, especially in lake whitefish from Management Area 4.4 of Lake Huron. We have cooperated with Ontario Hydro to try to ensure that this data is obtained and available to us. However, the question of tritium and other radionuclide discharges into the environment are an integral part of the cumulative impacts of the proposed Facility. These and other essential data relating to the cumulative impacts of the proposed Facility are not yet available. The proposed Facility should not be authorized until they are, and when they are, they should form part of a full environmental assessment by an independent panel.


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    X. G.   Uncertainties 


    1. Under Section 20(1) of the CEA Act, the project can be referred for panel review "where it is uncertain whether the project ... is likely to cause significant adverse effects."

    2. It is clear that there are many uncertainties with respect to this project, some of which are identified in the Comprehensive study and other of which are not dealt with at all. This is unacceptable, particularly to the Chippewas of Nawash and Saugeen because of our constitutionally recognized and affirmed Aboriginal status and our Aboriginal and treaty rights.

    3. We feel that the project must be viewed in the context of the Bruce Nuclear Power Development as a whole, of the future of Ontario Hydro as a corporation, and of the ultimate fate of this high-level radioactive waste material. The proposed dry UFDSF has an expected lifetime of 50 years -- a span of time approximately equal to the entire history of nuclear reactors in Canada and the world to date. Is such a long range operational commitment realistic, given the crippling problems that have beset Ontario Hydro's nuclear reactors in recent years, the decline in public support for the nuclear power industry worldwide, the financial and managerial problems of Ontario Hydro, and the rapidly changing structure of the electricity industry in North America, with privatization and competition imminent? Is it conceivable that there will be no nuclear power industry in Canada in 50 years, or no Ontario Hydro, or both? What then will happen to the high-level wastes in dry storage? Will they become radioactive orphans, like the historic wastes at Port Hope, Ontario, or the abandoned radioactive tailings at Bancroft, Blind River, Port Radium, and Uranium City?

    4. These questions, which are hardly dealt with in the Comprehensive Study , need to be fully aired, discussed and answered before an independent panel.


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    X. H.   No permanent nuclear waste disposal solution in sight 


    1. There is no permanent disposal facility in place for receiving high-level radioactive waste, and there is no assurance that there will be one in 50 years time. Thus there is no responsible body that is able to guarantee that these wastes will not remain on-site in perpetuity, despite Ontario Hydro's expectation that a permanent high-level waste repository will be operational in Canada by 2025. In the United States, there have been to date eight failed attempts to site a high-level radioactive waste repository, if we include the Yucca Mountain project as the most recent failure. Here in Canada, despite $700 million spent over 20 years by AECL and Ontario Hydro in attempting to "verify" the concept of permanent geologic burial in the Canadian shield, and a ten-year federal environmental assessment (FEARO) process -- including public hearings in five provinces -- the panel this year recommended against proceeding to siting: the panel found that the repository concept has not satisfied all the necessary safety criteria, and that it is not acceptable to most Canadians.

    2. Moreover, Ontario Hydro does not have money set aside to finance such a repository, which is expected to cost as much as $13 billion over its operational lifetime. Given these realities, one must question whether the currently proposed "interim storage" concept for irradiated nuclear fuel from Bruce reactors may not in fact become a "permanent storage" facility. In their submissions to the federal panel on the geological disposal concept, AECL and Ontario Hydro, the proponents of the geologic burial concept, have argued that it would be unacceptable to leave these nuclear fuel wastes indefinitely at the surface. But if it is unacceptable to the industry to leave the wastes in dry storage indefinitely, one must question whether the industry should store their high-level radioactive wastes in this fashion at all. A full assessment before an independent panel is needed to address this question among many others. Our concerns must be heard.


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    X. I.   Radiation and radiation health concerns 


    1. We now know that all radioactive materials give off (or "emit") invisible energy called "atomic radiation". Atomic radiation is harmful to living cells, even when the exposure (or "dose") is too small to cause any immediately noticeable effects. Cells which are damaged by atomic radiation may grow wrong, and multiply the damage by cell reproduction, resulting in a variety of illnesses:

      • A damaged cell in the body of a fully-formed human may develop into cancer 

        Atomic radiation is well-known as a cancer-causing agent, and there is no evidence of a "safe dose" -- a dose so low that cancer cannot be caused. Compared with the standards in place for human exposure to cancer-causing chemicals, the standards for permissible human exposure to radioactive materials are significantly less stringent.

      • A damaged cell in the body of a developing embryo can lead to birth defects  

        If an embryo is exposed to atomic radiation while in its mother's womb, radiation damage to just a few cells may be multiplied, resulting in any of a variety of abnormalities -- birth defects. The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation says that the most likely birth defect in humans as a result of radiation exposure is mental retardation.

      • A damaged sperm or egg cell may transmit genetic damage to descendants

         Damaged genetic material can be passed on from parent to child, thereby affecting not just one individual but generations of individuals to come. Although radiation-induced genetic damage has not been demonstrated in humans, it has been shown in every species studied in the lab. Scientists assume that genetic damage occurs in humans exposed to atomic radiation, and that there is no "safe dose" below which no genetic damage occurs.

    2. Yet Ontario Hydro's documents -- EA (1997) and Addendum to the EA (1998) -- seldom if ever refer to the unhappy human consequences of chronic exposure of populations to even relatively low levels of atomic radiation. The corporate attitude seems to be, that as long as exposures are within regulatory guidelines, there is nothing to be concerned about. We wish to challenge this corporate attitude as being scientifically, morally, and practically indefensible. Insofar as it is possible, we believe that the goal should be to achieve zero exposures to man-made radioactive pollution. We need an independent assessment process to question whether Ontario Hydro is willing to commit itself to work toward such a goal.


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    X. J.   "...alternative means of carrying out the project..." 


    1. As stated above, the CEA Act requires that alternatives to the project that are technically and economically feasible be considered.

    2. Ontario Hydro describes alternatives to its dry storage proposal in section 2.2 of the EA (1997). According to Hydro, there are three:

      • The first is "no-action", which "would necessitate the shutdown of the two generating stations ... when their existing fuel bays are filled". In section 4.9.1, Hydro states this option is "not considered to be acceptable."

      • The second is "Expansion of Existing Fuel Bays or Construction of New Fuel Bays". In comparison with dry storage, Hydro has concluded that both of these options "would require higher initial and life-cycle costs", would give "less schedule flexibility", and would "require more maintenance"; therefore these options "have not been pursued further".

      • The third is dry storage.

    3. Thus, Hydro has decided, using corporate criteria unrelated to the statutory factors of economic and technical feasibility, or even health, safety, or environmental protection, that there ARE no ''acceptable'' options to be discussed. The second criterion in the paragraph above, it should be noted, is concerned with cost, not economic feasibility. 

    4. The Chippewas of Nawash find this to be an unacceptable starting point; all alternatives should be judged on their merits. If one alternative is more expensive, but safer and more conducive to environmental protection, its merits should be judged on the basis of ALL criteria.

    5. For example, fuel bays are equipped with HEPA filters in case of atmospheric particulate radiation releases, as well as ion-exchange resins to collect and remove fission products and other contaminants that might leak from irradiated fuel bundles into the water in the pool. Fuel bays also allow for regular monitoring of fuel bundles for radiation leaks, and segregation of damaged bundles from undamaged bundles. Comparable services are not available for irradiated fuel in dry storage. Fuel bay options may have disadvantages in comparison with dry storage which could also be examined. An independent federal review should look at all feasible options dispassionately.


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    X. K.   Defence-in-Depth 


    1. Other options could also be considered for interim storage of irradiated fuel, provided they satisfy the "defence in depth" philosophy -- often cited by Ontario Hydro and AECL in other contexts. "Defence in depth" refers to a system of multiple redundant and independent containment envelopes to provide needed assurance that radioactive contaminants from damaged nuclear fuel will not be released into the environment under accident conditions. For example, in the core of an operating CANDU reactor, there are many barriers to the release of radioactivity to the environment:

      • First, there is the uranium fuel pellet itself; but many radioactive gases and vapours succeed in escaping from the pellet and entering the "gap" between the uranium pellet and the zirconium sheath.

      • Next there is the zirconium sheath; when there are defects in the sheath, however -- e.g. holes or cracks -- this barrier can also be breached.

      • Then there are the pressure tubes and the primary piping system of the reactor core; even with substantial failures of the fuel sheaths, most of the radioactive materials that may escape from the irradiated fuel will be trapped within these pipes.

      • In case of a pipe break in the primary cooling system, or a stuck valve (such as occurred at Three Mile Island), radioactive materials can escape from the piping system into the reactor building; but then there is a "containment envelope" within the reactor building which is designed to keep most of the escaping radioactivity out of the environment.

      • Finally, there is a separate building -- the vacuum building -- which is maintained at negative pressure so that it can suck up virtually all of the radioactive steam, gases, vapours and particulates in case of an accident.

    2. "Defence in depth" is used in relation to older fuel as well. Recently, a federally appointed Environmental Assessment Panel concluded a ten-year review of the nuclear industry's concept of permanent deep geological burial of irradiated fuel in underground chambers excavated in the Canadian Shield. In elaborating this concept, AECL highlighted the "defence in depth":

      • First, there is the ceramic pellet itself; but over long periods of time under adverse conditions, radioactive materials may escape from the pellet.

      • Next there is the zirconium sheath; eventually, however -- probably in a much shorter time frame -- this barrier may also breached.

      • Then there are special canisters made of solid copper or titanium, containing the used fuel bundles, and designed to last for several centuries without leakage.

      • Then there is the backfill material surrounding the canisters, made of specially adsorbent glacial till to retard the migration of radionuclides from the irradiated fuel into the geologic medium.

      • Next there is a bentonite ''plug'' designed to swell and seal the shaft of the repository to prevent water movement through the shaft and/or into fractures in the walls of the repository.

      • Finally there is the rock mass itself -- hundreds of miles of solid granite, relatively impermeable and sparsely fractured, which -- it is hoped -- will prevent radionuclides migrating from the repository to the surface environment at anything more than a glacial pace.

    3. In comparison, it would appear that Ontario Hydro's current dry storage proposal does not enjoy the same "defence in depth" that is accorded to very young (hot!) irradiated fuel in the core of a reactor, or much older irradiated fuel stored in a geologic repository. Several layers of protection seem to be missing.

    4. The wisdom of this should be questioned in an independent federal environmental assessment. If one can imagine extreme circumstances in which radioactive materials could be released from dry storage containers in significant amounts, no matter how unlikely the mechanism, then there should be back-up systems -- filters, containment structures, or the like -- to trap those escaping radioactive materials and prevent them from being widely disseminated. For example, dry storage containers could be located in a rocky subterranean cavern, fully accessible to allow for monitoring and/or retrieving the irradiated fuel if needed. Within such a cavern, a containment envelope could be provided for the whole facility complete with HEPA filters and other devices.

    5. During a panel environmental assessment, the Chippewas of Nawash wish to be able to challenge the wisdom of storing irradiated nuclear fuel in above-ground containers outside of any other containment structure. This point becomes particularly relevant when one considers that the period of interim storage of spent fuel may greatly exceed expectations.


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    X. L.   Groundwater flow and existing contamination sources 


    1. There is evidence of radioactive contamination of groundwater at RWOS-1 (Radioactive Waste Operations Site 1) and possibly at RWOS-2 (Radioactive Waste Operations Site 2). According to the Overview Cumulative Effects Assessment, incorporated into the Addendum to the EA (1998):

        "Ontario Hydro plans to remove waste currently stored at RWOS-1 for storage at RWOS-2. This action is necessary in order to remove the likely source of tritium and other radioactive material contamination in local soils and groundwater at RWOS-1, as identified through groundwater monitoring.... It is anticipated that this work will be undertaken over a 2 year period beginning in 1999 and ending in 2001."

        Overview Cumulative Effects Assessment,
        Section 8.3.3, p. 29

    2. Evidence of a possible groundwater contamination problem at RWOS-2 is not conclusive, but has to be treated seriously. A tritium contamination measurement of 3,000 becquerels per litre was taken some time ago in a ground water sampling hole just outside the fence of RWOS-2 not far from the ditch that leads to Stream C. According to AECB document BMD 98-42:

        "A rising trend has been observed in tritium concentrations at Water Sampling Hole WSH-231, to levels which are inconsistent with what is being observed in the rest of the ground water monitoring network at Site 2.... Ontario Hydro indicated that the discrimination of an individual source is not possible with the existing information.... "

        AECB BMD 98-42, p. 4

    3. While the Overview Cumulative Effects Assessment section of the Addendum to the EA (1998) does identify concerns about tritium contamination of groundwater, as well as a host of other environmental concerns, in a series of interesting tables, there are no specific actions suggested. The Chippewas of Nawash believe that the purpose of a Cumulative Effects Assessment is not only to identify existing or potential environmental concerns, but to address them in such a way as to limit the harmful effects in space and time.

    4. Therefore, as part of a cumulative effects assessment, we believe that the groundwater flow pattern underlying BNPD should be characterized much more precisely and reliable methods to determine individual sources of groundwater contamination should be developed and tested. Without such tools, adding another radioactive waste storage facility adjacent to the existing facilities at RWOS-2 is ill advised; it will make it even more difficult to determine the precise source of any given radioactive contamination problem -- bearing in mind that tritium is one of the two radionuclides Ontario Hydro considers most likely to be released from a Dry Storage Container under abnormal conditions.


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    XI.   IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOX PROPOSAL


    1. The Addendum to the EA (1998) states:

        "The CANDU reactors at the BNPD site are being considered as potential candidates for the use of MOX fuels potentially from nuclear weapons decommissioning. However, given that this project is currently in the very early development stages, the effects of using MOX fuels at BNPD have not been addressed in this CEA   [ Cumulative Effects Assessment ] . "

        Overview Cumulative Effects Assessment,
        Section 8.5.2, p. 32

    2. Our understanding is that the Bruce reactors are not just "potential candidates" -- they are in fact the ONLY candidate CANDU reactors for the use of MOX fuel fabricated from weapons-grade plutonium extracted from nuclear warheads in the USA and Russia. Although the MOX project is at the early stages of development, and is by no means certain, one could say the same about the siting of a high-level radioactive waste repository in the next 50 years, or even the restart of Bruce A. Ontario Hydro already has a great deal of information about the MOX project -- more than enough to assess how it relates to the BUFDSF proposal.


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    XI. A.   The Status of the CANDU MOX Initiative 


    1. In many respects the MOX project is quite advanced. Already a small amount of weapons-grade plutonium has been fabricated into MOX fuel at the Los Alamos weapons lab in the US for testing in a Canadian reactor; it is scheduled to be transported to Chalk River within months. Similarly, in Russia, weapons-grade plutonium extracted from dismantled warheads has been fabricated into MOX fuel for testing in Canada, and is scheduled to be transported to Chalk River within months. The Chalk River tests will simulate the anticipated use of MOX fuel in Bruce reactors. Thus the MOX Initiative should be part of any Comprehensive Assessment or Cumulative Effects analysis of the proposed BUFDSF.

    2. According to an untitled AECL document obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, eleven Canadian Task teams have been working on different aspects of the Russia/Canada MOX proposal. Canadian nuclear scientists attended a MOX Transportation seminar and workshop in Russia from July 8 to July 16 1996:

        "The Canadian Task 3 team provided a seminar to their Russian counterparts on each of the Task 3 aspects (Safeguards, Security, Transportation and Packaging), including a technical presentation on a proposed transport risk assessment process which would allow for Russian and Canadian input to the evaluation criteria."

    3. After the seminar, the Russian team arranged for the Canadians to meet their transport and packaging experts based in St. Petersburg. Then in August 1996, according to the same AECL document cited above, a Russian delegation reciprocated by visiting the Zircatec CANDU fuel fabrication plant at Cobourg, touring the Ontario Hydro facilities at Pickering, and participating in meetings about the MOX project at Chalk River. In September 1996, a Canadian delegation visited P.A. Mayak (Chelyabinsk-65), a hitherto top-secret Russian military installation that processed plutonium for Russian weapons during the Cold War era. All of this activity was predicated on the eventual use of the Bruce A reactors to begin using CANDU MOX fuel incorporating plutonium extracted from Russian and American nuclear weapons.

    4. An AECL Progress Report "Russian/Canadian Feasibility Study for Dispositioning Excess Russian Weapons-Grade Plutonium Using CANDU Reactors (Phase 2)" dated October 1996 states:

        "The objective ... is to provide information to the Canadian public and decision makers on the technical, environmental and economical feasibility of fabricating CANDU MOX fuel in Russia and transporting it safely to Ontario Hydro's Bruce A nuclear power station for consumption there. Teams of experts from both countries are currently studying all the key activities related to the implementation of a large-scale plutonium disposition program."

        AECL Progress Report, Oct. 1996, p.1

    5. Among the "technical objectives" outlined on page 2 of the Progress Report is "determining any modifications required at Bruce Nuclear Power Plant for storing and processing the fresh Russian-made MOX fuel and for disposing of the spent MOX fuel." Thus there is a direct link with the proposed BUFDSF, as Ontario Hydro will own the irradiated MOX fuel and will have the obligation of handling it, safeguarding it, storing it, and "disposing" of it when and if an acceptable method of "disposal" is found.

    6. The Chippewas of Nawash believe that Ontario Hydro should be obligated to discuss those aspects of the MOX project that are directly relevant to the BUFDSF proposal in the context of a federal environmental assessment conducted by an independent panel.


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    XI. B.   Extra heat and radioactivity from irradiated MOX fuel 


    1. According to the limited documentation available to us, an irradiated MOX fuel bundle would have a significantly larger inventory of fission products than a normal irradiated CANDU fuel bundle, and would therefore generate substantially more heat. Could this added heat load adversely affect the radiological safety of a Dry Storage Container? Would it add to or alter the inventory of radioactive substances available to be released as vapours under accident conditions? Might it affect the spacing of the irradiated fuel bundles inside the dry storage container? Would the presence of MOX add significant neutron radiation to the gamma radiation that is already anticipated?

    2. We think it altogether possible that, all things being considered, dry storage of irradiated MOX fuel might not be judged feasible or desirable. If so, then the dry storage containment option will have to be rethought and an alternative found for MOX fuel. But if such is the case, why not do the right thing from the outset -- choose the alternative storage method now, rather than outdoor dry storage? Or design a dry storage method with MOX in mind from the outset? Whatever the upshot of these considerations, we feel it is imprudent and irresponsible to discuss the BUFDSF without regard to the fact that it might have to accommodate irradiated MOX fuel within its planned 50-year lifetime.


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    XI. C.   Danger of criticality in a flooded Dry Storage Canister with MOX fuel 


    1. In Appendix C of the 1997 Safety Report, Ontario Hydro carries out a criticality analysis to determine whether an accidental nuclear chain reaction could occur within a dry storage container if water were to infiltrate into the interior and act as a neutron moderator. Such a criticality event could lead to a catastrophic dispersal of radioactive materials into the environment. Under even the most extreme conditions, Hydro's analysis shows that criticality cannot occur with normal CANDU fuel because the plutonium available in the irradiated fuel bundles is insufficient in quantity or concentration to form a critical configuration. In the case of irradiated MOX fuel, however, might not the results of this analysis be markedly different? Inevitably, the plutonium in irradiated MOX fuel will be much more abundant and much more reactive (with a higher concentration of weapons grade material) than that in ordinary irradiated CANDU fuel, so criticality can more easily be achieved. Such considerations may rule out the dry storage option for MOX. Failure to analyze such an accident scenario is a major deficiency in the Safety Report and in the EA.

    2. According to a Pickering Significant Event Report dated October 7, 1996:

        "A review of the Pickering criticality assessment for the Pickering Used Fuel Dry Storage Container, which had been done by Reactor Safety and Operational Analysis Department (RSOAD) in 1991, found that an assumption for the spacing between bundles that had been input into the WIMS analysis code was wrong by a factor of 2. The result of the review and assessment of the impact of this error is that the criticality factor of the most reactive configuration analyzed in the Safety Report should be 0.71 instead of the 0.37 value that was predicted in 1991. The 0.71 value is still well below the standard criticality value of 0.95, reconfirming the safety of the PUFDSC's. [ Pickering Used Fuel Dry Storage Containers ]"

        Pickering PND-A Significant Event Report No, 96-399

    3. We find it disturbing and illuminating that such a basic arithmetic error affecting such an important safety topic could escape detection for five years. In the Pickering case, the predicted margin of safety was cut in half simply by correcting an erroneous assumption. At Bruce, with the more reactive MOX fuel, a similar arithmetic error could predict a margin of safety regarding the possibility of an accidental chain reaction when there is no margin of safety at all. This example underscores a more general concern: the inherent uncertainty resulting from Hydro's reliance on safety analyses based on computer codes that use simplified mathematical models and a large number of (possibly incorrect) assumptions.


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    XI. D.   Security requirements for MOX fuel 


    1. If MOX fuel is to be used at Bruce, physical security becomes of paramount importance due to the strategic importance of weapons-grade plutonium. Existing security arrangements at Bruce may not be good enough. In our view, the EA does not provide adequate reassurance in this regard, as it relies only on the existing level of security:

        "The project site was selected after careful evaluation of several available locations within the BNPD boundary. It was selected primarily on the basis of its central location between the two NGS sites, environmental suitability, and the benefit of the existing amenities of the adjacent RWOS-2 facility: security control and environmental monitoring. "

        EA (1997), Section 2.1

    2. It is our understanding that weapons-grade plutonium is the primary nuclear explosive in most nuclear weapons, and that the amount of plutonium in the Nagasaki bomb was scarcely larger than a grapefruit. If the MOX proposal goes ahead, there would be more than enough weapons-grade plutonium in 10 CANDU MOX fuel bundles to make an atomic bomb. We ask: could the MOX fuel itself become a target for theft by international criminals and terrorist groups? Will Ontario Hydro be required to provide high-security storage facilities for the fresh MOX fuel, and demonstrate an ability to withstand armed assault? Is this in itself not an aspect of Cumulative Impacts that must be addressed?

    3. We understand that a typical irradiated MOX fuel bundle would contain about two-thirds as much plutonium as a fresh MOX fuel bundle. This being so, would the irradiated MOX fuel require special security provisions too? Hydro should be prepared to answer such questions and to support the answers with relevant documentation and analyses before any decision is made on accepting or not accepting MOX. It may be that outdoor storage of irradiated MOX fuel is not able to provide the required degree of security, and that some other alternative would have to be found. Yet that other alternative should be considered now, in the context of possible MOX imports.

    4. If an armed assault were launched by some criminal or international terrorist organization to obtain weapons-grade plutonium in the form of fresh MOX fuel, might the dry storage containers also be targeted by the attackers to create a diversion? Could a dry storage container withstand the force of an armour-piercing grenade launcher? If not, the UFDSF may be judged to constitute an unwarranted security risk, and it could become obsolete as a new, indoor storage facility is built to take its place. But in such a case, the outdoor Dry UFDSF was never needed in the first place; an indoor solution could have been developed from the start.


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    XI. E.   The proposed facility: a magnet for MOX? 


    1. Our (and presumably many other Canadians') concerns in a cumulative sense are not limited to (in the words of the Comprehensive Report) "the effects of using MOX at BNPD", but also relate to the critical question of whether and how the existence of the proposed BUFDSF may or may not contribute to the possibility of the realization of the MOX proposal. In easy-to-understand terms: if the proposed development is built, it may contribute to the life of the BNPD. This in turn may provide added incentive to restart Bruce A and thereby encourage or facilitate the use of MOX at Bruce. This is, in itself, an effect of the proposed project at this point in time (whether or not it actually comes to pass). It is one that the should have addressed, and is now a factor that must be addressed at an assessment conducted by an independent panel.

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